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C
heap food has been taken for granted for almost 30 years. From their 
peak in the 1970s crisis, real food prices steadily declined in the 1980s 
and 1990s and eventually reached an all-time low in the early 2000s. 
Rich and poor governments alike therefore saw little need to invest in agri-
cultural production, and reliance on food imports appeared to be a relatively 
safe and efficient means of achieving national food security. However, as 
the international prices of major food cereals surged upward from 2006 to 
2008 these perceptions quickly collapsed. Furthermore, although food prices 
are now lower than their 2008 peak, real prices have remained significantly 
higher in 2009 and 2010 than they were prior to the crisis, and various simu-
lation models predict that real food prices will remain high until at least the 
end of the next decade.
  Needless to say, the stability and effectiveness of the world food system 
are no longer taken for granted. For researchers and policymakers alike, the 
food price crisis presented nothing but puzzles. Many possible causes have 
been identified, but their relative importance is uncertain. A number of stud-
ies estimated the impacts of rising food prices, but these simulations often 
generated unconvincing results, and most were limited by the absence of gen-
eral equilibrium effects, country-specific price changes, and other relevant 
shocks, such as rising fuel prices. Moreover, while the recent crisis closely 
resembled the 1974 crisis, international policymakers still failed to prevent 
history from repeating itself. In this research monograph the authors explore 
these puzzles through a review of the existing literature and fresh analysis. 
While hardly the last word on the subject, this timely and unusually compre-
hensive assessment of the crisis will be a valuable resource both for research-
ers trying to make sense of current problems and for policymakers deciding 
how to prevent future crises.
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F
rom 2005 to May 2008, the international prices of major food cereals 
surged upward, in many cases more than doubling in the space of a few 
years, and in some cases—such as rice—more than doubling in the space 
of just a few months.1 Although food commodities are not unique in under-
going such rapid price rises (energy and mineral prices have also surged), 
a sharp escalation in the price of basic foods is of special concern to the 
world’s poor. All poor people spend large portions of their household budgets 
on food, and most impoverished people depend on food production for their 
livelihoods but have very limited capacity to adjust quickly to sharp changes 
in relative prices. Consequently, surging food prices have caused panic and 
protest in developing countries and have presented the policymaking commu-
nity with a challenge at least as severe as the 1972–74 global food crisis.
  This review of the 2007–08 food crisis attempts to provide a balanced and 
comprehensive assessment of the causes and consequences of the crisis for 
researchers and policymakers alike. This study was finalized in early 2010, 
about 18 months after international cereal prices peaked and then plum-
meted, before rising again in 2009. It is therefore an appropriate point in 
time to reflect on the events of 2008 and the preceding years, reassess our 
understanding of the crisis (especially in light of the sharp drop in prices), 
and update the evidence on the impacts of the crisis with new data and fresh 
analysis. It is also an opportunity to emphasize to policymakers that food 
prices remain high by historical standards in both international and local 
markets, and that if higher prices in 2007 and 2008 were at least partly the 
result of fundamental pressures on international cereal markets, then it is 
reasonable to expect prices to remain high in the years to come (especially as 
economies recover from the financial crisis). Indeed, without actions to repair 
some significant flaws in the global food system, the food crises of 1972–74 
and 2008 could be repeated, perhaps sooner rather than later.
  Regarding the causes of the 2007–08 crisis, this report aims to review the 
latest evidence in the literature, given that we have the luxury of more time 
xii
1 Much of this document builds on Headey and Fan (2008), although several sections are derived 
from additional work for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), including 
Headey and Raszap Skorbiansky (2008) and Headey (2010). Moreover, the analysis presented in 
Headey and Fan (2008) is updated and extended in several important dimensions.(two years since the peak of food prices in April–May 2008). Many academic 
reviews link problems that existed before the food crisis to the rise in prices, 
without providing compelling evidence of causal linkages. Many are also gen-
erally based on preliminary evidence only or often use piecemeal approaches 
rather than comprehensive ones. Indeed, the more one assesses this crisis, 
the more one concludes that it is the result of a complex set of interacting 
factors rather than any single factor.
  Despite this complexity, the assessment presented here suggests that 
some explanations still hold up much better than others. This set of inter-
connected factors includes rising energy prices, the depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, low interest rates, and investment portfolio adjustments in favor of 
commodities. All these factors are related to a range of underlying global 
macroeconomic phenomena that affected both food and nonfood commodi-
ties. As for agriculture, specifically, energy prices are a significant supply cost 
in cereal production, but rising energy revenues also fueled increased cereal 
demand from energy-exporting nations. However, a major effect of rising 
energy prices was the consequent surge in demand for biofuels. Demand for 
biofuels had a stronger effect on maize than on other biofuel crops (such as 
oilseeds), although knock-on effects for other food items may have been sub-
stantial (especially for soybeans). Interestingly, we also find that the surge in 
U.S. maize production for biofuels was of an order-of-magnitude equivalent 
to the primary explanation of the 1972–74 crisis—the surge in U.S. wheat 
exports to the Soviet bloc.
  The surge in rice prices stands apart as being almost entirely a bubble phe-
nomenon. The late and rapid rise in rice prices, almost all of which took place 
in the first few months of 2008, was closely related to the export restrictions 
of several major international producers and to large precautionary imports 
from major international consumers. These shocks compounded the existing 
volatility in rice prices that arises from the relatively thin international trade 
in rice. Export restrictions were also important for wheat markets, although 
these were partly triggered by weather shocks to wheat production, espe-
cially in the case of Ukraine. The Australian drought was also a significant 
short-term factor, especially as southern hemisphere exporters like Australia 
and Argentina (who restricted wheat exports) provide counterseasonal wheat 
supplies to northern hemisphere countries.
  In contrast to other assessments, we do not attribute much of a role to 
other factors cited in the literature, by politicians, or by the popular press. 
Many people cite surging demand from China and India, including the shift in 
their diets toward more meat consumption, and hence greater demand for 
feed cereals. This research theme was prominent prior to, and independent 
of, the 2008 food crisis, and it was brought up again as the crisis unfolded, 
SUMMARY  xiii   albeit as an untested hypothesis. However, surging demand from China and 
India turns out not to present any compelling linkages to the crisis. At the 
national level both countries are largely food secure, so they rarely rely on 
substantial food imports, except some oilseeds. It is true that both countries, 
especially China, have experienced greatly increased demand for energy and 
other minerals, but their demand is by no means the only cause of rising oil 
prices and is perhaps not even the main cause. Chinese demand for soybeans 
has also grown dramatically, but since 1995 rather than very recently. More-
over, this longer term increase in demand was accommodated mostly by 
area expansion in Brazil and Argentina, so the effects on other commodities 
would appear to be quite limited. China and India might also have influenced 
international food prices by depleting their stocks of major cereals, but 
there is no direct evidence that declines in their stock influenced expecta-
tions elsewhere. In China’s case, estimated stock levels in the 1990s were 
excessively high, and still are, so China shows little or no sign of being unable 
to feed itself in the foreseeable future. India’s stocks also declined from 
excessive levels and were briefly too low during the crisis, which may have 
led to the hasty decision by India to ban rice exports in November 2007—an 
action that undoubtedly had a large adverse effect on international rice 
prices. But these are all quite indirect linkages to the crisis, and in fact we 
find that growth in cereal imports was much stronger among other sets of 
countries, including Mexico, the European Union (E.U.), and a range of Middle 
Eastern and North African (MENA) countries.
  Another perennial research literature that was prominent before the food 
crisis was declining yield growth in cereal production and related trends, such 
as low levels of agricultural research and development (R&D) and land degra-
dation. These problems are certainly significant in some parts of the world, 
but the real linkage to international prices must come from global supply 
and demand, which is best examined by looking at global cereal production 
per capita and trade statistics. It turns out that production per capita has 
indeed declined, but about three-quarters of that decline is explained by fall-
ing production in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. However, that trend 
did not affect international trade, because the former Soviet bloc countries 
actually increased cereal exports to the rest of the world over this period. 
Hence much of the decline in global grain production simply relates to struc-
tural change in transition countries, which does not appear to have adversely 
affected international prices. The remainder of the decline comes from Sub-
Saharan Africa, where cereal production has struggled to keep up with rapid 
population growth. Here the factors cited above probably are pertinent—low 
R&D, soil degradation, climate change—but Africa is a very small player in 
international cereal trade, so the linkage is tenuous at best.
xiv  SUMMARY  Stock declines in other countries, especially the United States and other 
major cereal importers, are also a compelling explanation for the price crisis. 
However, there are two problems with this explanation. First, global stock 
declines are much less impressive once policy-driven reductions of the exces-
sive stocks in China and the former USSR are excluded. Second, because 
stocks are a residual, stock declines in other countries primarily reflect deeper 
causes, such as rising demand or insufficient supply. Indeed, in the case of 
wheat markets we find that trade shocks reduced U.S. wheat stocks, so that 
low stocks can hardly be a cause of the crisis. Similar results are true of 
biofuels demand and U.S. maize stocks. Hence we do not believe low stocks 
were an important cause of the crisis.
  Another contentious factor relates to speculation in futures markets. 
Futures markets are normally thought of as an instrument for price discovery, 
but the entry of noncommercial participants has raised fears that speculators 
may be artificially driving up prices. Our view is ultimately agnostic, because 
we believe it is impossible to discern causality in the context of futures 
markets, even from time series econometrics, as futures-market variables 
represent expectations of the future. Thus the usual Granger-causality tests 
are potentially irrelevant, because expectations of price rises at time t might 
be noncausally associated with higher prices at time t + 1. However, whether 
or not futures market activities were a cause of the crisis, we find it unlikely 
that they were a driving force, if only because we have substantial confidence 
in several of the more tangible explanations of the crisis discussed above: oil 
prices, biofuels demand, a depreciating U.S. dollar, and various trade shocks, 
in particular.
  The remainder of this monograph assesses the consequences of the crisis. 
Here, too, considerable academic work has been done, much of it impressively 
quickly. However, the broader weakness of this research is a large disconnect
between macro- and microeconomic assessments of the consequences of 
rising food prices. For example, macroeconomic studies look at the effects 
on import bills, foreign exchange reserves, and fiscal deficits, but there are 
generally no linkages down to the household level. Other macroeconomic stud-
ies look at price transmission, but that is certainly not the same as impact. 
A country might have low rates of transmission but only because it has 
decreased food taxes or increased subsidies, actions that place the burden 
of rising international prices on the fiscal deficit (or back on to international 
prices, in the case of export bans), rather than on to consumer prices. More-
over, what is typically called “transmission” sometimes also reflects country-
specific factors, such as agricultural output shocks or loose monetary policies.
  Microeconomic studies, in contrast, often lack good data on actual price 
changes at the country level; they must therefore assume that international 
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simulate the effects of arbitrary price changes, such as 10 percent food infla-
tion. And of course, most microanalyses have the usual limitations of simula-
tion techniques, especially somewhat simple assumptions regarding consumer 
and producer responses. A further weakness of much of the microeconomic 
work is that it solely focuses on food prices, even though it is quite pos-
sible that rising oil prices could have similarly large effects on poverty and 
national welfare. It is true that poor people generally spend much more of 
their income on food than on fuel. However, least-developed country (LDC) 
oil imports are 2.5 times larger than LDC food imports, and rising oil prices 
raise the prices and restrict the output of other goods. These facts indicate 
that the overall effects of rising oil prices could certainly be on par with the 
impacts of rising food prices in many cases and could thus further worsen the 
food crisis.
  Despite these qualifiers, our review of local price trends in developing 
countries does show that real prices in 2008 were substantially higher than 
prices in 2007, often double, especially around the middle of 2008. The good 
news is that prices generally did start to decline in late 2008 as international 
prices fell. Had higher prices persisted, the crisis could have turned espe-
cially severe. The bad news is that price rises were surprisingly high in a 
large number of countries. In Africa, prices rose especially high, particularly 
for imported products principally consumed by urban populations, but also for 
some local commodities that are not widely traded (indeed, commodities for
which international prices are not even reported). In this monograph we can 
only speculate on why African prices rose so substantially, and ultimately the 
answer remains a matter for future research.
  With the worst of the food crisis over, this monograph provides a timely 
discussion of how the 2008 food crisis compares to the previous food crisis 
of 1972–74. In many ways the two crises had similar causes, including rising 
energy prices, similarly sized shocks to U.S. cereal demand (from the Soviet 
bloc in the 1970s and from the biofuels industry today), low interests rates, 
and the devaluation of the dollar, as well as declining stocks and some adverse 
weather shocks. The most daunting aspect of the existing global food system 
is not only the strong possibility that food crises are an inherent aspect of the 
global food system—which is pervaded by various distortions of production, 
trade, and agricultural investment and suffers from a huge regional imbalance 
in cereal production—but also that this system may well be hit hard by several 
shocks in the future. These include adverse weather shocks and declining 
productivity related to climate change, and a recurrence of oil price shocks 
and surging biofuels demand. The real concern is that the precipitous fall in 
food prices over the second half of 2008 will once again lead to the wide-
xvi  SUMMARYspread apathy toward the agricultural sector that has prevailed among policy-
makers in both developed and developing countries. Indeed, a long history of 
neglecting agricultural investments has made it difficult for many developing 
countries and their donors to quickly scale up agricultural investments in the 
wake of the crisis. Despite these obstacles, sustained and smart investments 
in developing-country agriculture will be essential if the world food system 
is to finally deliver what it ought to: greater food security and real income 
gains for the world’s poorest people.
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Introduction
B
eginning in 2003, international prices of a wide range of commodities 
surged upward in dramatic fashion, in many cases more than doubling 
in a few years and, in some cases, in a few months. Yet unlike other 
commodities, surging food prices are of special concern to the world’s poor. 
Many impoverished people depend on food production for their livelihoods, 
and all poor people spend large portions of their household budgets on food. 
Sharply rising prices offer few means of substitution and adjustment, espe-
cially for the urban poor, so there are justifiable concerns that millions of 
people may be plunged into poverty by this crisis, and that those who are 
already poor may suffer further through increased hunger and malnutrition. 
Equally grave concerns have been felt with respect to the impacts that rising 
food and fuel prices may have had on macroeconomic stability and economic 
growth. And although the food and fuel crises have largely abated since mid-
2008 and have taken a back seat to the ongoing global financial crisis, food 
prices have remained high by historical standards and are predicted to stay 
high in the years to come.
  Prior to the financial crisis, high food prices certainly received a great 
deal of attention from policymakers, the media, and the academic commu-
nity. Active and often heated debate has arisen regarding what may have 
caused the food crisis, what impact it will have on the poor, and—on the 
basis of the debate—what needs to be done to resolve the crisis. Much of the 
nonacademic commentary on these issues was not based on evidence backed 
by research. Much of the academic research was also necessarily “quick and 
dirty,” in response to the pressing needs of policymakers. However, some of 
this research was insightful, resourceful, and impressively rigorous, given the 
sudden demand for such work. For the most part, this monograph constitutes 
a review of existing research on the food crisis, synthesizing the best results 
and pointing out the knowledge gaps we still have. In doing so we follow in 
the footsteps of several capable and rigorous assessments of the crisis. These 
include the work of Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008, 2009) and Mitchell (2008) 
on the causes of the crisis, and Abbott (2009) on its consequences. We draw 
1on these works quite extensively, and sometimes revisit and revise them 
empirically. However, in addition to reviewing and revising this evidence, we 
regularly augment it where necessary (and feasible) with fresh research. 
Indeed, the present research provides several important new pieces of evi-
dence on both the causes and consequences of the crisis.
  A second group of papers inadequately addresses some specific questions 
on the consequences of the crisis. Although often technically adept, this body 
of research is of limited use for a robust assessment of the likely impacts 
of the crisis. Several papers follow Ivanic and Martin (2008) in using micro-
economic data to simulate the impacts of rising food prices on household 
poverty. Other papers in this group look at macroeconomic effects, such as 
the strength of transmission from international to domestic prices (Dawe 
2008) or the impact of rising food prices on import bills (IMF 2008a). Ideally, 
a full assessment of the short-term impacts of the crisis on poverty requires 
consideration of both macroeconomic impacts and transmissions, as well as 
household and intrahousehold effects, for both food and fuel price increases. 
Some country studies admirably adopt a more comprehensive line (Arndt 
et al. 2008; Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao 2008), but cross-country analyses of 
this kind are notably absent. To partially bridge this gap, we collect and ana-
lyze a new and impressively large Global Information and Early Warning Sys-
tem (GIEWS 2009) dataset on food prices in developing countries. Such data 
can be used to broadly infer where consumers have been severely effected, 
although the impacts on farmers remain unclear.
  A final objective of this monograph is to look beyond the events of the 
past few years. We show that the current crisis bears some remarkable 
similarities to—as well as some equally important differences from—the first 
food crisis of 1974 (Headey and Raszap Skorbiansky 2008). The similarities 
between the two crises lend credence to the hypothesis that the causes of 
these crises relate to some deeper failings of the global food system. In Chap-
ter 4 we compare the two crises and consider this hypothesis.
  As we discuss in the concluding chapter (Chapter 5), some of these failings 
were addressed after the 1972–74 crisis, but with only limited success, and 
some were not addressed at all. Particularly important is the large regional 
imbalance in cereal production. Africa’s poor track record in agricultural pro-
duction may not have been a significant cause of the crisis, but it undoubt-
edly makes the region highly vulnerable to the vagaries of international mar-
kets. Reversing a long-term decline in agricultural investment in Africa and 
other lagging regions is an immense and difficult step but almost certainly 
a necessary one. The good news is that donor commitments to agricultural 
development were indeed scaled up drastically in 2008. The concern is that 
2  CHAPTER 1the global financial crisis will mean that many of those commitments will not 
be honored or sustained into the future.
  A system of global reserves was also never set up in the wake of the 
1972–74 crisis despite much research and a number of international meetings. 
Suggested solutions to the current crisis once again include an international 
system of grain reserves, as well as a system of virtual reserves to address 
speculation in futures markets. However, our assessment concludes that low 
stocks and speculation were, at best, indirect causes of the crisis. Further-
more, international grain reserves also have their problems, and a great deal 
of further research would be required before effective real or virtual reserve 
systems could be put in place. Freer trade may also be a more viable means 
of stabilizing cereal prices, although the political barriers are undoubtedly 
daunting.
  Whatever the solutions, they must be sought and sought collectively, because 
the global food system does indeed face global challenges in the years ahead. 
Factors that were not important causes of the crisis—such as changing diets, 
climate change, and a greater incidence of natural disasters—may yet impose 
significant pressure on international food markets in the near future, as may 
many factors that were important in this crisis, such as higher energy prices 
and biofuel production. We hope the evidence presented in this monograph 
will encourage researchers and policymakers to take the food crisis of 2008 
seriously. Some of the price rise was indeed a passing bubble, but much of it 
was also related to real supply and demand pressures on international food 
markets. Worse still, the price changes and consumption losses witnessed in 
developing countries were all too real and all too costly.
INTRODUCTION  3   CHAPTER 2
Causes of the Crisis
B
road-based research studies have attempted to identify the factors that 
might have caused the recent surge in food prices, but only a few have 
attempted to add explicit (albeit approximate) orders of magnitude to 
each factor. In this chapter we review, reassess, and extend the evidence on 
this issue. A significant constraint on all assessments of the crisis, including 
ours, comes about because it is a global phenomenon and one regarded by 
many as a distinct event. Thus some of the usual tools favored by economists 
for uncovering causality, such as regression analysis or simulation models, 
have quite limited application in this context. Instead, some less formal 
“detective work” is needed, involving a mix of economic theory, economic 
history, and more rudimentary statistical analysis. The review begins with a 
reassessment of the basic facts of the crisis. Bearing these facts in mind, each 
individual explanation of the crisis is assessed in terms of how well it holds up 
against both the general facts and the more specific evidence.
Commodity Price Formation: A Conceptual Framework
Implicit in all discussions of the causes of rising food prices is some model of 
commodity price formation. That said, there seems to be little agreement as 
to how international commodity prices are formed. As we discuss below, some 
writers emphasize traditional agronomic determinants of commodity prices 
(such as the role of stocks and the interactions between stocks and various 
supply and demand movements), some see macroeconomic phenomenon as 
critical, and still others emphasize the role of futures markets in influencing 
spot prices. Less frequently discussed is whether international price increases 
are predominantly driven by price changes in U.S. markets—because the 
United States is the largest exporter of maize and wheat, and the third largest 
exporter of soybeans—or whether other markets are also price makers.
  To address the price-formation question more explicitly, Figure 2.1 sets 
out a comprehensive model of price formation in major international (exporter) 
grain markets. The model is centered around the complex interactions among 
supply, demand, actual prices, and price expectations. Buyers and sellers of 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.grain reach price arrangements based on a host of supply and demand condi-
tions but also on expectations of future prices, especially as grains are storable 
commodities. Price expectations themselves are influenced by current prices 
and supply conditions (such as area planted, levels of stocks, and weather 
forecasts) but also by grain reports (which transmit explicit information on 
supply and demand conditions) and futures markets (which transmit more 
implicit information about where market actors think prices may be heading 
over various time horizons). The remainder of the model sets out some of the 
hypothesized determinants of price movements in the current crises—such as 
the interplay among weather, export restrictions, and precautionary (or panic) 
purchases —and such factors as exchange rate movements, economic and popu-
lation growth, R&D, and the nexus between oil prices and biofuels.
  The model’s transmission mechanisms and outcomes are conditioned by 
a range of parameters and relationships (listed as “additional factors” in the 
box on the right side of Figure 2.1), including supply and demand elastici-
ties, interaction effects among factors, feedback loops, and various dynamic 
nuances relating long- versus short-term price adjustments. These complexi-
ties have some important implications for how well any analysis can identify 
the causes of the crisis, particularly more formal analytical techniques, such 
as simulation models or time series econometrics. To give just one example, 
Headey (2010) argues that two of the most important causes of the food 
crisis were government interventions on both the supply side (for example, 
export restrictions) and the demand side (such as government-to-government 
import deals). In effect, these policies meant that supply and demand elas-
ticities changed during the crisis in quite perverse ways; that is, high prices 
led to supply restrictions and demand surges. Hence simulation models or 
time series regressions that use or derive pre-crisis parameters could well 
be incorrectly specified. So instead of adopting these more formal but more 
restrictive techniques, we opt to treat the crisis as a distinct event—albeit 
one with similarities to previous crises—best investigated with what we can 
only describe as economic detective work. To push that analogy further, we 
acknowledge upfront that most of the evidence that we and others bring to 
bear on this case is circumstantial at best.
Some Basic Facts of International Grain Markets
In addition to the general model in Figure 2.1, it is also important to consider 
how the four major international markets for staple foods—maize, rice, soy-
beans, and wheat—vary with respect to price formation.1 Some of the major 
facts of these grain markets are as follows:
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1 The following paragraphs draw heavily from Schepf (2006).1.   Dominance of the U.S. grain markets. The United States heavily dominates 
global exports of maize (60 percent) and wheat (25 percent), and although 
U.S. soybean exports have been overtaken by those of Argentina and Bra-
zil in recent decades, the United States is still the world’s third largest 
soybean exporter. Only in rice markets is the United States not a leading 
exporter. Hence U.S. grain prices are typically quoted as international 
prices for all grains except rice, where Thai prices are typically quoted.
2.   Importance of U.S.-specific factors. Given Fact 1, events in the U.S. 
economy or in U.S.-dominated grain markets can be thought of as possible
suspects in the recent food crisis. Such events include the advent of bio-
fuels, the depreciation of the U.S. dollar and the build-up of dollar reserves 
in other countries, and movements in commodity futures markets. That 
said, trade shocks in the U.S. market are also important. Schepf states 
that “Since the market events of 1972 [in which the Soviet Union made 
unexpected purchases of large amounts of U.S. grain] most market observ-
ers consider exports to be the great uncertainty underlying commodity 
supply, demand, and price forecasts” (2006, 17).
3.   Degree of competition and market efficiency in the United States. These 
three U.S. grain markets are highly commercialized and, despite the impor-
tance of some large players (for example, Cargill), these markets are highly 
competitive. They have a sophisticated market infrastructure, including 
the information services of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and 
the price-discovery functions afforded by futures markets.
4.   Seasonality and inelastic supply and demand functions. Because most 
grains are limited to a single annual harvest, new supply flows to market 
in response to a postharvest price change must come from either domestic 
stocks or international sources. Hence, supply elasticities tend to be highly 
inelastic in grain markets, making them very vulnerable to relatively small 
shocks, especially when stocks are low. Similarly, demand elasticities tend 
to be low, because the farm cost of basic grains generally amounts to a 
small share of the retail cost of consumer food products in developed 
countries.2 In poor countries demand can be inelastic for the opposite 
reason: poor people are so close to subsistence that higher prices of their 
staple grain force them to concentrate their consumption on this essential 
item.3
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2 In other words, changes in grain prices generally have little impact on retail food prices 
and therefore little impact on farm-level demand. For example, a 20 percent rise in wheat 
prices would translate into only about a 1 percent rise in the price of a loaf of bread.
3 Indeed, higher prices could even induce the very poor to consume more of the grain (Jensen 
and Miller 2008).5.   Variations among wheat, maize, and soybean markets. Despite being 
generally inelastic goods, Schepf (2006) notes important variations among 
these grain markets. He argues that U.S. wheat prices are generally more 
stable than maize prices because (i) there are two crops annually for 
U.S. wheat; (ii) there are two counterseasonal southern hemisphere grain 
exporters (Australia and Argentina); (iii) there are price-stabilizing U.S. 
government policies for wheat; and (iv) feed demand can act as a price 
buffer for wheat. Soybean prices might also be less volatile because of 
more elastic demand (soybeans are mostly used as feed, for which there 
are substitutes), the rarity of trade restrictions on soybeans, and the 
existence of important counter-seasonal southern hemisphere producers 
(Brazil and Argentina). But soybean prices could be sensitive to demand 
shocks, because China and the European Union (E.U.) account for almost 
two-thirds of global imports. In contrast to wheat and soybeans, maize 
exports are heavily dominated by the United States (two-thirds of the 
global share), making the maize market very sensitive to events in the 
United States.
6.   Peculiarities of the rice market. As Timmer (2009) discusses, rice markets 
are very distinctive in that (i) only about 6 percent of global rice produc-
tion is exported; (ii) exports are dominated by Asian countries, such as 
Thailand, India, and Vietnam; (iii) most exporters and many importers of 
rice impose substantial barriers to trade; (iv) rice is extensively produced 
and traded by smallholders and small traders; and (v) demand for rice is 
highly inelastic, as it is the major food staple for millions of people in Asia 
in particular. Hence, international rice prices are generally more volatile 
than those of other grains, although domestic prices in Asia are much more 
stable.
Facts of the Crisis Itself
The basic price-formation framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 and the facts 
listed in the previous section provide us with a useful platform for inves-
tigating the causes of the crisis, although they make no specific mention 
of the events leading up to it. Hence in this section we focus on the facts 
pertaining to the crisis itself. Figure 2.2 presents long-term data on export 
prices from 1960 to mid-2008 for four major staples—maize, rice, soybeans, 
and wheat—as measured in key markets in the United States and, in the case 
of rice, key markets in Thailand. All measures are deflated using the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. Some of 
the same data are also used to more narrowly examine the growth rates of 
real prices over particular periods of interest (Table 2.1). In addition, price 
changes are included for a wider range of commodities categorized into 
8  CHAPTER 2various groups of interest (Table 2.1). Figure 2.3 focuses more on nominal 
short-term price data to more clearly delve into the timing of price changes 
in the current crisis. These three sets of data give rise to the basic facts 
outlined below.
  Consistent with the above arguments, the first observation is that long-
term trends may be relevant to an understanding of the current crisis. The 
price levels in mid-2008—when food prices peaked—are about as high as they 
were in the late 1970s or early 1980s in real terms (Figure 2.2). However, the 
nature of this crisis is not how expensive prices are relative to their historical 
trend, but how quickly they have risen, together with the related problem of 
behavioral adjustments by consumers and producers. Thus the first, and rather 
trivial, fact is that food export prices have risen very quickly. The rise in prices 
in the recent crisis is similarly sharp in percentage terms to the price shocks 
of 1972–74 crisis (Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1). In both crises, rice prices shot 
up the most (about 220 percent), but wheat prices rose steeply in 1974 (180 
percent), and maize and soybeans both exhibited rapid price increases on the
CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  9   



























Figure 2.2  Trends in real international prices of key cereals, 
1960 to mid-2008
Source:   IMF (2009a).
Notes:   Data are deflated using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic product 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.order of 50–90 percent. Although seemingly trivial, this speed component of 
the crisis is important, because it might focus suspicion on explanations that 
involve short-term factors rather than long-term changes.4
  A second fact that may hold some significance is that prior to the cur-
rent price rise the real prices of staple foods were at an all-time low after 
declining for the best part of 30 years. Whether these long-run trends and
the similarities to the 1972–74 crisis are truly integral components of the 
current crisis remains to be seen, but—as is explored below—there are good 
grounds for the argument that they are.
  A third fact that has yet to receive much attention is that the prices of
a wide range of commodities increased sharply. The surge in the price of oil
is well known, of course, as is its being a leading factor in the 1974 food 
crisis, but all energy prices have risen by 80–120 percent (so have the prices 
12  CHAPTER 2






































Figure 2.3  Trends in nominal prices of cereals and oil, 
January 2003–November 2009
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from IMF (2009a).
4 Of course, as will be shown, this is not necessarily the case. Long-term factors could have 
depleted stocks, which ultimately would have contributed to price increases.of metals and minerals), and fertilizer prices roughly quadrupled during both 
crises. Other agricultural commodities (for example, cash crops) have not 
risen anywhere near as quickly, however (Table 2.1). This observation begs 
the question of whether food-specific factors are driving the surge in food 
prices or whether other factors that have common effects across these com-
modity groups—such as the importance of energy costs in production, global 
macroeconomic factors (including growing commodity demand from China 
and India), or low interest rates and their effects on investment decisions—
are the dominant cause of recent price trends.
  A fourth fact is that the timing of price rises is somewhat different across 
commodities, and even across staple foods. The fourth column of Table 2.1 
shows percentage price changes from 2004 to the first five months of 2008 
only, and Figure 2.3 shows graphically which commodity prices rose first. Fig-
ure 2.3 shows that maize prices rose first, then wheat, and then rice. Table 
2.1 confirms that most of the price rise in wheat and maize occurred prior 
to 2008, but that three-quarters of the increase in the price of rice occurred 
in 2008—almost certainly because of adverse policy responses, such as export 
bans from some major exporters. Nevertheless, increases in rice prices from 
2004 to 2007, which were on the order of 60 percent, were actually higher 
than the contemporaneous price increases of the other three staple crops 
considered (57 percent for wheat, 44 percent for maize, and 28 percent for 
soybeans). This fact has mostly been overlooked, although it is worth not-
ing that rice is a thinly traded commodity (90 percent of all rice output is 
consumed domestically), and rice prices are generally more volatile than the 
prices of other staple crops. Hence rice is distinctive both in terms of the 
timing of the price rises and the nature of its international trade.
  A fifth fact is that the U.S. dollar has depreciated against a wide range 
of currencies. Against the other special drawing-rights currencies (the U.K. 
pound, euro, and Japanese yen), the U.S. dollar has depreciated some 30 
percent since the beginning of 2002. All commodities listed in Table 2.1 are 
expressed in U.S. dollars; thus the price increases would be much less sharp 
if measured, for example, in euros. The increase in nominal prices of key 
staples is about 25 percent less when measured in euros, somewhat less than 
that when measured against the USDA’s trade-weighted agricultural exchange 
index, and roughly the same when measured in pounds or yen. Some authors 
also consider U.S. dollar depreciation to be a causal factor in the crisis, an 
issue that is revisited below.
  A sixth fact is that in both the 1974 and 2008 crises, commodity prices 
quickly plummeted from their peaks. From 1974 to 1978 the prices of staple 
grains (and several other commodities) fell by about 50 percent (Table 2.1), 
with most of this decline occurring in 1975 and 1976. In the recent crisis, 
CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  13   prices peaked in May 2008, but by March 2009 prices of staple grains had 
fallen by 30 percent from that peak, while energy prices fell by about 50 
percent. Figure 2.3 shows that nominal prices have rebounded somewhat 
since the second half of 2008, with 2009 price still significantly higher than 
they were in 2005 or 2006. Nevertheless, the rapid rise and fall of commodity 
prices suggests a commodity bubble, with peak prices reflecting some kind 
of overshooting effect. Whether this effect is related to oil prices, dollar 
movements, export restrictions, or demand surges is ultimately an empirical 
question we shed light on in the next section.
Assessing Existing Explanations of the Crisis
As for the factors that are hypothesized to have caused the crisis, Trostle 
(2008) provides a very useful timeline of events, which we present in Figure 
2.4. The timeline distinguishes between supply- and demand-side factors, and 
also distinguishes between long-term factors (such as strong growth in demand 
and slowing agricultural production), medium-term factors (for example, 
dollar devaluation, rising oil prices, biofuels production, and the build-up of 
foreign exchange reserves); and short-term factors (such as adverse weather 
and various trade shocks). Following the taxonomy in Figure 2.4, the following 
discussion is structured around this chronology of events.
Strong Growth in Demand, Especially from China and India
Many studies, policy briefs, and media publications have attributed rising 
food prices to strong economic growth, especially the rapid growth in China 
and India. It is an explanation that has some intuitive appeal in that two 
countries with a combined population well in excess of 2 billion people, 
many of whom are indeed experiencing rapid income growth, have enormous 
potential to augment global demand for food and other resources. Such popu-
lar books as Who Will Feed China? have documented this possibility (Brown 
1995). Many observers writing on the crisis have referred to changing con-
sumption patterns in China and India, particularly the rapid growth in meat 
and vegetable consumption.
  In our reckoning the Asian-diet hypothesis is not corroborated by avail-
able data. Although it is true that diets in countries like China and India are 
changing, it is not at all obvious that these countries are becoming more 
dependent on cereal imports (except in the case of Chinese soybean imports, 
discussed separately below). For example, cereal import trends around the 
world indicate that Spain and Mexico stand out as the two countries that have 
most increased their cereal imports in the 2000s. No Asian country figures in 
the top 10 of that list, and China actually imported fewer cereals in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s (although the composition of imports changed). Indonesia 
14  CHAPTER 2has also been a larger importer of cereals, but has actually decreased its cereal 
imports in recent years (Headey 2010). So even though it is true that Asian 
countries have indeed experienced various increases in their consumption of 
fruits and some meats, this has not translated into larger cereal bills.
  If there is a China–India story, it is more indirect. First, China, and to a 
lesser degree India, are demanding more oil and more commodities. China 
has contributed about 30 percent of the increased demand for oil from 2000 
to 2006 and will continue to do so from 2007 to 2030 (Figure 2.5). Monthly 
import data in Figure 2.6 also suggest that rising oil imports in China could 
have contributed to rising oil prices, although the surge in oil prices is far 
more dramatic than the upward trend in Chinese imports.
  Of course, readers might be skeptical that Chinese demand for oil and 
metals could cause such a sudden upsurge in prices, given that China’s demand 
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Strong growth in demand, based on increasing population, strong economic growth,
rising per capita meat consumption
Slowing growth in agricultural production
Declining demand for stocks of food commodities
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Figure 2.4  Timeline of events contributing to the food crisis
Source:   Adapted from Trostle (2008).
Notes:   The authors added “Speculation in futures markets” to the original figure because 
this factor was excluded from Trostle’s (2008) analysis on the grounds that there 
was insufficient evidence at that time (R. Trostle, pers. comm., February 2010). In 
addition, the authors interpret all these factors as hypotheses only, whereas Trostle’s 


















Figure 2.5  Contributions to changes in primary oil demand, 1980–2000, 
2000–06, and 2006–30
Source:   IEA (2007, table 1.2). 
Note:   2006–30 data are based on the IEA (2007) projections.



































Figure 2.6  Chinese crude oil imports and international oil prices, 
September 2005–December 2009
Sources:   IMF (2009a) for price data, and General Administration of Customs of the People’s 
Republic of China (2008).for these commodities has been rising since the 1970s (Figure 2.5). However, 
oil market experts argue that supply response is sufficiently slow that, even 
when rising demand is foreseen, the industry still struggles to respond. More-
over, China’s economy was so flush with foreign exchange that it could afford 
to keep importing large volumes of oil even as prices rose, thus crowding other 
economies out of the market. In 2009—after the crisis—it also looks like the 
rebound in oil prices is intimately connected to strong growth in Chinese oil 
imports, as media reports have suggested.
  In summary, Chinese demand looks like an important component in the 
surge in oil prices, although previous analyses have also shown that rises in oil 
prices are also closely linked to political instability in the Middle East, Nigeria, 
and Venezuela and to supply decisions made by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (WRTG Economics 2008). As for India, its contribu-
tion to rising oil prices has thus far been fairly negligible, but its contribution 
will rise to 12 percent over the next 20 years or so (Figure 2.5).
  A second narrative about China is also quite indirect. Although China’s 
participation in oil and food markets has generally been steady, one agri-
cultural commodity for which China’s demand is characterized by a strong 
import surge is soybeans. In the mid-1990s China appears to have made a 
conscious decision to move away from domestic soybean production, which 
was relatively uncompetitive, and to instead rely on exports from North and 
South America. From a position of self-sufficiency in the early 1990s and 
before, Chinese imports of raw soybeans steadily rose to more than 50 per-
cent of global imports (Figure 2.7), while soybean oil imports have generally 
risen but fluctuated between 10 to 30 percent of global imports. However, 
Figure 2.7 also shows that this increase in demand has been accommodated 
by increased soybean production (almost entirely through area expansion) by 
Argentina, Brazil, and the United States.
  This trend has contributed to U.S. farmers’ shifting large amounts of land 
out of wheat, maize, and other coarse grains into soybeans. In fact, USDA 
data suggest that soybean production area increased by more than 11 million 
hectares during this period. By using average yields for other crops, simple 
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that non-soybean grain production 
in the United States might be 3 percent higher today than would have been 
the case had this switch not occurred. In Brazil, soybean exports were largely 
fueled by expansion of total agricultural area, such that the impact on pro-
duction of other crops was not strong.
  It certainly seems possible that China has had some modest effect on 
tightening coarse-grain production in the United States, but this increased 
demand was spread out over many years and seems to have been sufficiently 
accommodated by extensive production growth among the three major 
CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  17   exporters. However, one factor we have to consider is interaction effects. A 
plausible hypothesis is that increasing soybean demand from China from 1995 
onward reduced a great deal of the slack in U.S. soybean and maize markets 
(the two crops compete for land) such that when the biofuels surge occurred, 
the competition for land between maize and soybeans became much tighter. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, Figure 2.3 suggests that U.S. maize and soy-
bean prices have tracked each other closely during 2005–09.
  China and India may have had a third indirect effect on food prices by 
means of depletion of stocks. Largely because of increased demand for meat, 
grain consumption has risen rapidly in China from 1991 to the present, and it 
has often outpaced production growth. For example, maize consumption in 
China increased by 88 percent, but production increased by only 55 percent. 
Because China hardly imports any maize (it is generally one of the larger net 
exporters of maize), most of this excess demand was satisfied through the 
depletion of stocks.
  Of course, China may have contributed in some small way to the crisis 
through the depletion of stocks, but this seems fairly unlikely. For one thing, 
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Figure 2.7  Chinese imports of soybeans and soybean oil, 1990–2008
Source:   Constructed by the authors using data from USDA (2008c).
Note:   Global imports also equal global exports.China is not a major exporter of maize, and China’s stock levels were exces-
sively high prior to the recent surge and—at 22 percent of consumption—are 
still robustly above so-called optimal levels of 17–18 percent. And as for 
other cereals, China has long held excessively large stocks of wheat and rice. 
These stocks have declined somewhat in recent years, but relative to cur-
rent consumption they are still extremely high. Indeed, Slayton and Timmer 
(2008) have suggested that China could largely solve the rice-price problem 
simply by releasing these stocks. So if China’s declining levels of stocks have 
had an effect on prices, it may be through some indirect effects on market 
psychology. But because China is not a major exporter of these commodities 
and looks unlikely to become a major importer any time soon, such a strong 
sensitivity to Chinese stock estimates among non-Chinese markets would 
seem somewhat irrational.
  As for Indian stocks of major cereals, these have been quite low in recent 
years (see below), and agricultural output growth in India has been volatile, 
but sluggish on average. However, India is not a major importer of cereals. 
In fact, it is typically the world’s second largest rice exporter and is also 
a moderately large exporter of wheat. However, a poor wheat harvest in 
2006/07 led to pressure on India’s wheat stocks and India’s Public Distribution 
Scheme, which keeps stocks of both wheat and rice (Gulati and Dutta 2009). 
In 2006/07, government stocks of wheat fell short of buffer-stock norms, and 
about 6 million metric tons5 of wheat were imported. And although rice was 
in surplus and India exported more than 4.5 million tons of rice that year, 
the fear of a food shortage influenced policymakers, who faced impending 
national elections. Hence India’s decision to ban exports was not the result 
of rising economic growth or the end of India’s self-sufficiency in grain pro-
duction but rather the interplay of bad weather, government policies, and 
national politics.
  All in all, then, we believe that the China–India hypothesis can largely be 
dismissed as a direct explanation for the price surge. However, this is not 
to say that economic growth in general was not a factor contributing to the 
crisis. As we argue below, monthly trade data suggest that several demand 
surges in recent years seem to be closely linked with international price 
movements. But these demand surges came from a diverse array of countries 
that do not include China or India. In addition, China’s contribution to the 
rising prices of oil and other nonfood commodities was indeed a significant, 
albeit not the sole, factor involved.
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5 Throughout this monograph the term “tons” refers to metric tons.Productivity Decline and Falling R&D
Several press articles and policy briefs have cited declining productivity 
growth and declining stocks as the principal causes of the supply–demand 
imbalance (for a review, see Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2008). In many of these 
documents, slowing productivity growth is chiefly attributed to lower rates 
of investment in agricultural research. Declining yields are used as evidence 
for reduced growth, including a widely cited figure from the World Bank’s 
(2008c)  World Development Report that shows declining growth rates in 
yields of rice, maize, and wheat (especially in the 1990s). Other studies also 
cite land degradation as a cause of the productivity slowdown (see Pender 
2009). However, Fuglie (2008) argues that total factor productivity (TFP) 
measures are preferable and finds that TFP growth did not decline on aver-
age, but actually increased. Nevertheless, Fuglie did find that agricultural 
investment had slowed down, which potentially accounts for why TFP accel-
erated even as partial productivity growth measures decelerated.
  In our view, however, several arguments suggest that the productivity-
based explanation of the food crisis should be seriously questioned. Most 
importantly, it is highly questionable whether yield growth or TFP growth is 
directly relevant in this context. Logically, a global supply–demand imbalance 
relates to total production per capita and its impacts (if any) on global trade; 
yields and other productivity measures are only determinants of production. 
For a broader perspective, Figure 2.8 shows trends in yields, production, irri-
gation, and input use across regions and from the 1960s to today. The most 
pertinent measure is production per capita, and it is indeed true that global 
cereal production per capita was about 6 percent lower in the 2000s than 
it was in the 1980s. In other words, cereal production did not keep up with 
population growth.
  The most important question is “What caused this decline?” The answer 
is complicated, but one simple means of addressing the question is to calcu-
late global cereal production per capita after excluding individual regions, 
to supply at least superficial regional explanations of the decline in cereal 
production (Table 2.2). It turns out the oft-cited decline in Asian yield growth 
looks irrelevant (production growth would have been much lower if Asia were 
excluded from global production), confirming our earlier assessment of the 
China–India hypothesis. And although it is true that yield growth slowed in 
Asia, the slowdown came on the back of unsustainably high rates in the 1980s 
that resulted from the Green Revolution (a revolution cannot be sustained 
indefinitely). As shown below, poor performance in Australia is also not much 
of a long-term explanation, even though one could argue that climate change 
and unsustainable farming methods are affecting long-term growth.
20  CHAPTER 2  Africa’s experience is more relevant, because its population grew rapidly 
during this period, so Africa’s sluggish growth remains a reasonably strong 
explanation of the global decline in per capita agricultural production. But 
if one excludes Africa’s population and cereal production from the global 
calculations, the –6 percent reduction in global cereal production per capita 
increases to just –4.75 percent. So Africa’s poor performance only explains 
around one-quarter of the global decline. And for that one could certainly 
cite low R&D in Africa as an explanation, but only one of many. Other factors 
could include land degradation, the increasing exploitation of marginal lands, 
and some adverse outcomes of economic liberalization, which had negative 
impacts on both input and output markets (Kherallah et al. 2002).
  In any event, the remaining three-quarters of the decline in global 
food production is explained by poor performance in Europe (Figure 2.8), 
especially the former USSR and several Eastern European countries, which 
together account for virtually all the decline in European cereal production 
during 1985–2006 (Figure 2.9). The explanation of this decline does not con-
cern yields, which grew fairly quickly.
  The real story is instead about inputs: land allocated to cereals in Europe 
declined by 30 percent during 1985–2006, the population working in agricul-
ture fell by 50 percent, farming land equipped for irrigation declined by 26 
percent, and fertilizer use declined by 62 percent. In other words, one novel 
explanation of the food crisis is the fall of the Berlin Wall and the ensuing 
policy and institutional failures (Liefert and Swinnen 2002; Rozelle and Swin-
nen 2004). But international prices are primarily determined by trade, so 
for the decline in cereal production from East European and former Soviet 
regions to result in a rise in international prices, we need net exports from 
these countries to have also declined. However, USDA trade estimates sug-
gest that net exports from this region actually increased. Indeed, it is other 
regions that experienced a decline in net cereal exports over the 1990s and 
2000s: North America, South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the MENA 
region. The data also confirm that South Asia and East Asia (including India 
and China, respectively) are basically self-sufficient in cereals. Thus we find 
no substantial evidence that links a productivity decline to increased pressure 
in international cereal markets, except perhaps in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Rising Oil Prices
International fuel and food prices are closely linked historically. Rising oil 
prices were closely associated with the 1972–74 crisis and indeed were 
arguably the dominant factor, so there is clearly some precedent here (see 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). More systematic econometric evidence also con-
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Table 2.2  Growth rates in cereal production per capita, 1980s–2000s
 Growth  rate
Region (percent)  Implication
World (total)  –6.1
World minus Africa  –4.8  Africa accounts for almost one-quarter of 
      global shortfall
World minus Americas  –5.8
World minus Asia  –9.6  Asian growth was much stronger than global 
      growth
World minus Europe  –2.8  Eastern Europe accounts for almost half of 
      global shortfall
World minus Oceania/Australia  –6.3
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from FAO (2009).
Notes:   Growth rates are calculated as the percentage difference between average annual 
cereal production per capita during 2000–06 and average annual production in the 













Figure 2.9  Explaining Europe’s declining cereal production, 1985–2006
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from FAO (2009).firms this link. Using data from 35 internationally traded primary commodi-
ties for 1960–2005, Baffes (2007) finds that the pass-through of crude oil price 
changes to the overall non-energy commodity index is 0.16, whereas the 
fertilizer index had the highest pass-through (0.33), followed by agriculture 
(0.17) and metals (0.11).
  What explains this strong link? Oil can affect food prices through various 
channels, including both the supply and demand sides. Here we focus on two: 
supply-side costs of agricultural production and biofuels (which are discussed 
separately below).6
  On the supply side, oil and oil-related costs constitute a substantial com-
ponent of the production of most commodities, so rising oil prices provide 
a strong explanation of commodity-price escalation across a wide range of 
food and nonfood commodities. Moreover, unlike noncommodity sectors, 
agriculture is more reliant on fuel-related inputs than on other types of 
energy. Figure 2.10 compares International Energy Agency (IEA) data, which 
disaggregate energy usage by economic sector and by energy source. Total 
energy usage at the national level is then compared with total output mea-
sured in current U.S. dollars. Figure 2.10a shows that, relative to its output, 
agriculture does not use a large amount of energy in production. Clearly these 
calculations depend on the prices of different types of energy, however. For 
that reason Figure 2.10b shows the proportion of all energy usage in a sector 
that is accounted for by oil-related energy.
  Agriculture is second only to transport in the oil intensity of its energy 
usage, suggesting marginal costs in agricultural production could be quite 
sensitive to oil prices, although cross-country evidence listed in Appendix 
Table A.1 suggests that substantial variations exist across countries. U.S. agri-
cultural production in particular, though, is almost solely dependent on oil 
for its energy use. And to rising fuel costs we also need to add the enormous 
surge in fertilizer prices, most of which are made from energy products, such 
as natural gas. Indeed, energy costs can constitute up to 90 percent of the 
costs of fertilizer production (for example, nitrogen fertilizers), which helps 
explain why fertilizer prices rose by double the amount of cereal prices from 
2005 to 2008. Moreover, the bulky nature of grains means that agricultural 
prices are strongly influenced by transport costs.
  But just how substantial are energy costs in food production and trade? 
Mitchell (2008) provides the best appraisal of the effect of energy costs on 
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6 One might add some kind of general inflationary effect, but our focus is on changes in food 
prices relative to other prices. Rising oil prices also positively affected the economic growth of 
energy-exporting economies, many of which are major importers of food staples. This effect is 
discussed separately below.rising export prices, although some of his calculations are rather sensitive 
to the methodology he adopts. First, Mitchell (2008) finds that the contribu-
tion of the energy-intensive components of total production costs (fertilizer, 
chemicals, fuel, lubricants, and electricity) in U.S. production were 13.4 per-
cent for maize, 6.7 percent for soybeans, and 9.4 percent for wheat. Mitchell 
uses these data to calculate that the production-weighted average increase 
in the cost of production due to these energy-intensive inputs for these crops 
was 11.5 percent between 2002 and 2007. Transport costs also increased 
because of higher fuel costs, and the margin between domestic and export 
prices reflects this increase. Mitchell (2008) calculates that the margin for 
maize between central Illinois and the Gulf ports increased from US$0.36 to 
US$0.72 per bushel, whereas the margin for wheat between Kansas City and 
the Gulf ports registered hardly any increase at all. An export-weighted aver-
age of these prices suggests that transport costs could have added as much 
as 10.2 percent to the export prices of maize and wheat (comparable data 
were not available for soybeans). Hence Mitchell (2008) estimates that the 
combined increase in production and transport costs for the major U.S. food 
commodities—maize, soybeans, and wheat—was at most 21.7 percent during 
2002–07.
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Energy use per million U.S. dollars of output

































Figure 2.10  Intensity of energy and oil use in production: Some 
macroeconomic measures
Sources:   Calculations by the authors using data from IEA energy balance sheets on energy 
use by source of energy and sector (IEA 2008), and United Nations (2008) national 
accounts data on value-added in U.S. dollars by sector.
Note:   Sample includes a set of more-developed countries (excluding one significant outlier, 
Australia) and less-developed countries.  However, in recalculating production costs ourselves, we found that 
Mitchell’s (2008) estimates are somewhat sensitive to his assumptions, and 
that energy-related production costs were probably higher than the 11.5 
percent increase that Mitchell derived. For one thing, total production costs 
include several nonexplicit (imputed) costs associated with the management 
side of farm production that are more-or-less fixed costs. In terms of more 
variable operating costs (which exclude management-related items), we 
calculate that fuel-related costs are about 80 percent of the total. Second, 
Mitchell deflates his cost measures by yield differences between 2007 and 
2002 (to calculate per bushel energy costs), but yields were unusually low in 
2002 for wheat and maize. Using 2001 data actually makes some difference. 
Third, the energy component of rising production costs is probably best cal-
culated by asking what production costs would be in 2007 if fuel-related costs 
had only increased by the same margin as prices in the broader economy (that 
is, by the GDP deflator), which was about 20 percent during 2002–07. In that
case it would appear that production costs were 30–40 percent higher in 
2007 than they would have been without oil-related cost increases during 
2001–07 (Table 2.3). Hence, at least for U.S. production costs, we find that 
rising energy costs are a strong factor. We also note that the rise in energy 
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Table 2.3  Estimated impact of fuel-related costs on U.S. farming 
costs, 2001–07
Row
number Indicator  Maize  Soybeans  Wheat
1  Yield gap (ratio of 2001 to 2007 yields)  0.9  0.9  1
2  Total costs in 2007 with 2001 cost levelsa   325.1  225.6  180.1
    (U.S. dollars) 
3  Actual total costs in 2007 (U.S. dollars)  453.5  295.4  235.7
4  Difference (row 3 – row 2) (U.S. dollars)  39.5  30.9  30.9
5  Difference deflated by yield growth  35.5  27.8  27.8 
    (row 4 x row 1) (U.S. dollars) 
6  Change in prices received by farmers (percent)  132.6  99  101.7
7  Oil-related cost increase as a percentage of   8  11  20.3
    the total price increase paid to farmers 
    (row 5 ÷ row 6) 
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from USDA (2008b).
Notes:   The percentage change in prices uses actual prices received by farmers for 2000/2001 
and actual prices received by farmers in 2006 multiplied by the percentage change in 
U.S. export prices, because actual prices received by farmers in 2007 were not avail-
able at the time of writing. If farmers received less than the full U.S. export price 
change from 2006 to 2007, then the last indicator (oil-related cost increase as a per-
centage of the total price increase paid to farmers) is underestimated.
aExtrapolated to 2007 using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis gross domestic product deflator.prices predates that in food prices, which at least suggests the possibility that 
rising energy prices caused food prices to increase, rather than the reverse.
  However, we also attribute a large role to demand-side factors that 
would have interacted with supply-side factors affecting production costs. If 
the supply curve alone had shifted upward because of rising fuel prices, the 
profits of farmers and food wholesalers would not normally be expected to 
rise much unless demand was very inelastic. Because U.S. farmers (and major 
firms, such as Cargill) experienced sharply rising profits in 2006, 2007, and 
2008 (see Appendix Table A.2), it can safely be inferred that demand factors 
are also important contributors to rising food prices. Indeed, we argue below 
that biofuels and import surges are two highly significant sources of demand 
growth.
Biofuels
The third and newest link between oil prices and food prices is biofuels. Once 
oil prices exceed US$60 a barrel, biofuels become more competitive, and grains 
may be diverted to biofuel production (Schmidhuber 2006), especially if high 
oil prices are expected to persist. Most of the more rigorous analyses to date 
conclude that the diversion of the U.S. maize crop from food to biofuel uses 
constitutes the largest source of international biofuel demand and the largest 
source of demand-induced price pressure (Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2008; Mitch-
ell 2008; Schepf 2008; von Braun 2008a). The reasons are as follows:
1.   The use of maize for ethanol grew especially rapidly from 2004 to 2007, 
and ethanol production used 70 percent of the increase in global maize 
production.
2.   The United States is the largest producer of ethanol from maize and is 
expected to use about 81 million tons for ethanol in the 2007/08 crop year 
(USDA 2008a).
3.   The United States accounts for about one-third of global maize produc-
tion and two-thirds of global exports, so impacts on U.S. production easily 
affect international prices (Mitchell 2008).
4.   European biofuel production is concentrated on biodiesels and uses about 
7 percent of global vegetable oil supplies (amounting to about one-third 
of the increase in vegetable oil consumption from 2004 to 2007).
5.   Biofuel production in other parts of the world is either relatively small or 
uses different crops (for example, sugarcane in Brazil), which have not 
experienced price surges.
  Biofuels constitute a major new source of demand in maize and vegetable 
oil markets, so biofuels are an especially strong candidate to explain price 
rises in these markets. But the knock-on effects for other foods are also sig-
28  CHAPTER 2nificant. In the United States, rapid expansion of maize area by 23 percent in 
2007 resulted in a 16 percent decline in soybean area, which reduced soybean 
production and contributed to the 75 percent rise in soybean prices from April 
2007 to April 2008 (Mitchell 2008). In Europe other oilseeds displaced wheat 
for the same reason.
  Another knock-on effect of significant concern is that biofuels have added 
substantially to the depletion of grain stocks. Several studies try to estimate 
these effects. Mitchell (2008) estimates that had areas planted in vegetable-
oil crops for biodiesel been used for wheat production, European wheat 
stocks would almost have been as large in 2007 as they were in 2001 rather 
than lower by almost half (although it is not clear that in the absence of bio-
fuel production farmers would have increased areas devoted to wheat). The 
U.S. maize story is also different, because even though some “new” land was 
diverted to maize production, most of the maize provided for biofuel produc-
tion came from existing land and from production that would otherwise have 
been used to feed people or livestock.7
  Several formal studies have simulated the effects of various biofuel sce-
narios on food prices. Generally, these simulations are difficult to compare, 
because they can vary substantially in terms of time periods considered, 
prices used (export, import, wholesale, and retail), coverage of food prod-
ucts, the currency in which prices are expressed, and whether prices are real 
or nominal (Schepf 2008). Different methodologies will typically give differ-
ent outcomes. General equilibrium models generate long-term price impacts 
resulting from specific shocks by factoring in interactions among markets, but 
their ability to capture short-term price dynamics is highly constrained. Con-
versely, detailed studies of specific crops may include the short-term dynam-
ics, but they often exclude the impact on other markets. There are also issues 
of whether shocks are considered to be independent (Schepf 2008).
  In spite of these methodological variations, most studies find biofuel 
production to be a significant driver of food price trends, as Schepf’s (2008) 
review of these studies concludes. In terms of short-run studies, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that biofuel demand has accounted for 
70 percent of the increase in maize prices and 40 percent of the increase in 
soybean prices so far (Lipsky 2008). Collins (2008) used a mathematical simu-
lation to estimate that about 60 percent of the increase in maize prices from 
2006 to 2008 may have been due to the increase in maize used for ethanol. 
The Council of Economic Advisors (Lazear 2008) estimates that retail food 
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7 Even the USDA suggests that biofuel diversion in the United States is a much larger source of 
demand than increased demand from China (see Helbling, Mercer-Blackman, and Cheng 2008, 
figure 4).prices increased only about 3 percent during 2008 due to biofuel production, 
but this low value is largely because they only considered the impact of maize 
prices on retail food prices, for which raw maize only constitutes a small por-
tion of the total value-added.
  Rosegrant et al. (2008) use a partial equilibrium model to calculate 
the long-term impact on weighted cereal prices of the acceleration of bio-
fuel production from 2000 to 2007 to be 30 percent in real terms. Maize, 
wheat, and rice prices were simulated to increase 47, 26, and 25 percent, 
respectively (applying Schepf’s conversion to the real-price estimates of the 
model), which is similar in order of magnitude to values calculated using the 
World Bank’s linkages model (World Bank 2008a).
  In terms of the effects of U.S. biofuel policies, a study by the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) attempts to measure the pure 
and joint price effects of the U.S. biofuel subsidies and tax credits. FAPRI’s 
study (Meyers and Meyer 2008) suggests that implementation of subsidies (in 
the absence of the tax credit) will raise maize prices by about 19 percent 
once the new long-run equilibrium has been established. The FAPRI study 
also estimates that the ethanol tax credit of US$0.51 per gallon supports 
maize prices by a slightly smaller amount—11 percent. Because of interac-
tions between the two subsidies, it is estimated that joint implementation 
of both the Renewable Fuels Standard and tax credit supports maize prices 
by about 20 percent. Strong effects were also observed by FAPRI for other 
commodities because of competition for land: the wholesale price of soybean 
oil is projected to increase 73 percent under the joint subsidy + tax-credit 
scenario. A similar study by the Center for Agricultural Research and Develop-
ment (CARD) found that the subsidy + tax-credit program supported the price 
of maize by 16 percent (McPhail and Babcock 2008). Both studies found the 
results to be highly dependent on the price of petroleum (or gasoline), which 
substitutes for government incentives and diminishes the relative impact of 
such incentives on maize prices. Schepf (2008) notes that neither study evalu-
ates the effect of the U.S. import tariff of US$0.54 per gallon on imported 
ethanol from Brazil, although the CARD study points out that the maize price 
impacts would be greater if the tariff on Brazilian ethanol were eliminated. 
In addition, neither study includes the effects of the various grants and sub-
sidized loans that have been made available to the U.S. biofuel sector for 
research and infrastructure development. Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) are 
also critical of some of the studies discussed above, insofar as they incorpo-
rate substitution effects that are stronger than those observed in the real 
world. Biofuel lobby groups have also pointed out that ethanol only uses the
starch in maize, preserving the maize oil and protein, so that about one-third 
30  CHAPTER 2of the maize made into ethanol goes back into the animal-feed system. Hence 
the diversion from food uses is generally overestimated.
  Despite these qualifications, there is little doubt that biofuel demand in 
the United States is having a major impact on maize prices and probably on 
soybeans as well, while E.U. and European agricultural trends toward increased 
oilseed production have increasingly affected wheat markets. Moreover, the 
unwillingness of these governments to move away from biofuel subsidies will 
probably keep agricultural markets significant tighter for years to come. Helb-
ling, Mercer-Blackman, and Cheng (2008) also note an asymmetry: biofuel 
industries have large effects on agricultural prices and very small effects on 
oil prices. So for the moment at least, biofuels are not substantially lessen-
ing the impact that rising oil prices are having on agricultural production and 
trade.
Declining Stocks and Reserves
The total supply of agricultural goods depends not only on current production 
but also on available stocks. Moreover, stocks are probably the most direct 
indicator of security for both food self-sufficient countries and major food 
importers who monitor the stocks of their largest suppliers. For such com-
modities as rice, which is dominated by consumers who depend on rice as their 
staple food, demand is highly inelastic. It is only when demand for stocks is 
added to demand for current consumption that total demand becomes more 
elastic (because a decrease in production can be compensated for by release 
of stocks). Conversely, relatively small changes in supply at low levels of stocks 
can result in rapid price changes (Wright 2009). Food scientists and economists 
have generally argued that countries need to keep stocks of around 17–18 per-
cent of total consumption or use levels (FAO 1983), although a clear distinc-
tion should be made between countries that predominantly consume staples 
and those that predominantly export them. Exporters of staples usually have 
little interest in keeping any reserves in excess of those needed to ensure a 
steady supply of staples to their export destinations, although hoarding is pos-
sible if suppliers are confident that a price rise is on the horizon.
  Stocks certainly seem to be highly relevant to the current crisis, if only because 
there has been much more action in the trends of stocks for major staples than in 
production tends. Indeed, stocks have declined markedly in recent years. Figure 
2.11 presents a highly aggregated picture of trends in the global stocks of wheat, 
maize, and rice relative to the global consumption of each staple, along with the 
average real international dollar price of all three staples.
  Agricultural economists rightly emphasize that when stocks are high, 
prices are generally low and stable. This high-stock/stable-price regime char-
CAUSES OF THE CRISIS  31   acterized the 1950–60s, and the 1980–90s, but not the 1970s or the current 
decade. Indeed, declining stocks preceded the 1974 food crisis, when wheat 
stocks declined from 30–35 percent of consumption in the 1960s to just more 
than 20 percent in the early 1970s, and maize stocks declined from more than 
20 percent in the 1960s to just 12 percent during the 1972–74 crisis (Rojko 
1975). Rice stocks—which are primarily produced and consumed in developing 
Asia—were just being built up in the 1960s as the Green Revolution began, 
so they are less relevant in explaining the 1972–74 crisis. Likewise, in the 
recent crisis the stocks of all three staples declined at about the same time, 
2000–2003, before the price surge. Maize stocks in particular have shrunk 
to well below the 17–18 percent benchmark, and rice and wheat stocks are 
now roughly at that benchmark. The facts support the conclusion that stock 
declines present a potentially powerful explanation for the price increases, 
because stocks declined across all three major staples, and these declines 
occurred well before the current crisis (and well before the 1972–74 crisis).
  Our view, however, is that stock declines only offer a superficial expla-
nation for the price surge, and that the relevant factors determine what is 
behind the decline in stocks. We suggest three possible explanations of why 
32  CHAPTER 2
Estimated end-of-year stocks
(percentage of consumption)
Average real price index







































Figure 2.11  Global trends in stocks relative to consumption, 1960–2008
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from USDA (2008c).stocks have declined. First, declining stocks might simply reflect increased 
demand or reduced production levels, which would then push the burden of 
explanation back to other factors, such as weather shocks or biofuels. Sec-
ond, stock levels could have declined because of exogenous policy decisions, 
such as the view that stocks were too high or involved too much wastage. 
This observation seems particularly pertinent to China as well as some of the 
former Soviet bloc countries. And third, prices could affect stock decisions, so 
that very low food prices up until 2003 may have decreased the apparent need 
to hold stock, especially given the advent of just-in-time inventory systems.
  All these explanations have some merit, but they are very difficult to 
observe empirically. The most important means of delving further into the 
stocks story is to set aside China. China is estimated to have had immensely 
high stock-to-use ratios for all major cereals in the 1990s—on the order of 
70–90 percent—and markedly reducing these stocks was a justified policy
action for China. Table 2.4 presents stocks of major consuming and export-
ing countries and recalculates global trends with and without China for 
1990–2000 and 2005–08. Netting out China turns out to be very important.8 
World stocks for maize, for example, declined from 26 percent of consump-
tion during 1990–2000 to just 14 percent during 2005–08, but excluding China 
from the global figures suggests that world stocks remained the same over 
the two periods, at just 12 percent. However, because the United States 
heavily dominates maize exports, U.S. stock trends—which declined from 
16 to 12 percent over the two periods—still offer a promising explanation of 
maize price trends. The USDA has argued that biofuel production has already 
contributed to the depletion of U.S. maize stocks and will continue to do so in 
the next decade (USDA 2008a), and maize prices, biofuel demand, and maize 
stocks all appear to have changed at about the same time (Figure 2.12).9 It is 
also possible that surges in foreign demand in 2006 and 2007 also contributed 
somewhat to these stock declines, as we show below.
  The story for wheat is complicated. Without China, world wheat stocks 
declined from above the recommend 17–18 percent threshold in the 1990s 
(19 percent) to several points below the threshold in 2005–08 (14 percent). 
Stocks declined in Canada, Europe, India, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia (to just 
7 percent of use), Ukraine, and the United States (bizarrely, stocks increased 
significantly in drought-affected Australia). What explains this almost perva-
sive decline in stocks? There appear to be two factors: one is long term and 
the other short. The long-term story is that, globally, per capita production 
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8 One caveat here is that the USDA only projects stock levels in China, so we cannot claim that 
data errors do not significantly alter our inferences from these data.
9 See Dawe (2009) for similar arguments.34  CHAPTER 2
Table 2.4  Trends in stocks relative to domestic consumption plus exports 
among major exporters and consumers, 1990–2000 and 2005–08
   Level  of
Commodity  Country or region  exports  1990–2000 2005–08 Stock  outcome
Maize  Argentina  Major  6  7  Up but low
  China  Minor  93  24  Well down but still 
            high
  India  Major  3  7  Up but low
 EU-15  Minor  8  14  Up
  United States  Major  16  12  Well down
 World  — 26  14  Well  down
  World (excluding China)    12  12  Unchanged
Rice China  Moderate  70 29  Well  down
 EU-15  Minor  22  37  Up
 India  Major  18  13  Down
 Pakistan  Major  19  8  Well  down
 Thailand  Major  7  13  Up
 United  States  Major  15  14  Unchanged
  Vietnam  Major  2  7  Up but low
 World  — 33  17  Well  down
  World (excluding China)  —  14  13  Largely unchanged
            but low
Wheat Argentina  Major  4  3  Always  low
 Australia  Major  20  35  Up
  Canada  Major  32  24  Down but still high
  EU-15  Major  16  11  Down and below 
            optimum
  India  Major  13  6  Down and below 
            optimum
 Kazakhstan Major  23  14  Down
  Pakistan  Minor  17  11  Down and below 
            optimum
  Russia  Major  16  7  Down and below 
            optimum
 Ukraine  Major  23  11  Down
  United States  Major  27  21  Down but still high
  China  Minor  71  38  Well down but still
            very high
  World  —  27  18  Down but still 
            adequate
  World (excluding China)    19  14  Down and below 
            optimum
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from USDA (2008c).
Notes:   EU-15 includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; —, not 
applicable.
Stocks / (consumption 
+ exports)of wheat grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s but stagnated in the 1980s and 
declined in the 1990s. The long-term decline in production is, again, almost 
entirely due to the structural changes taking place in the former USSR coun-
tries. Hence, when the former USSR and China are excluded from the global 
estimates of wheat stocks/use ratios (Figure 2.13), the recent crisis is marked 
by fairly moderate declines in wheat stocks, in contrast to the 1970–74 crisis, 
when stocks in the United States were severely depleted by exports to the 
USSR and China (that is, the Communist countries kept their stock-to-use 
ratios constant at the expense of stocks-to-use ratios in the Western coun-
tries). The short-term wheat story appears to be a combination of some poor 
harvests (2002, 2003, and 2006) and increasing international demand: average 
annual production growth was 1.7 percent during 2000–08, whereas average 
annual export growth was 2.3 percent despite rising prices. In the case of wheat 
we show below that surges in foreign demand entirely explain the sharp decline 
in U.S. stocks in 2007.
  For rice, the exclusion of China suggests that there has been virtually 
no change in the global stock-to-use ratio. China is estimated to have had 
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Figure 2.12  Trends in stocks, prices, and biofuel production: U.S. maize
Sources:   Data on stocks, usage, and biofuels were calculated by the authors using data 
from USDA (2008c); data on maize prices were calculated by the authors using data 
from IMF (2008b).
Note:   2005 = 1 for all series.extremely high stock levels (70 percent of use in the 1990s) and has quite 
rationally reduced them. Indian and Pakistani stocks have also decreased 
to what may seem like perilously low levels, although there are caveats in 
these cases as well. Pakistan (unlike India) tends to export a large proportion 
of its rice production (chiefly the Basmati variety), whereas in India stocks 
came down from inefficiently high levels and were still well above the long-
term norm during the recent food crisis (Gulati and Dutta 2009). Wheat stock 
declines in India reflect poor harvests that resulted in that country engaging 
in unusually large imports in 2006 (6 million tons). Indeed, it was actually its 
recent experience with wheat shortages that prompted the Indian govern-
ment to restrict non-Basmati rice exports in November 2007, as well as a surge 
in demand for Indian rice exports, possibly because of substitution effects 
from the ensuing crisis in international wheat markets (Headey 2010).
  In other major exporting countries the stocks story is even less compel-
ling. Stocks have actually almost doubled in the world’s largest rice-exporting 
country (Thailand) and have been rising quickly in another leading exporting 
country (Vietnam). Thus stocks do not look like an important factor in deter-
mining rice prices, except insofar as they contributed to India’s rice export 
ban, which did have a big impact on surging prices beginning in late 2007. 
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Figure 2.13  Global trends in wheat stocks-to-use ratios
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from USDA (2008c).Instead, export bans, panic buying, and a justifiable fear that more such 
actions would follow seem to be the principal causes of the rice crisis. In this 
regard our assessment partly contradicts that of Wright (2009).
  Are stock declines, then, a powerful story when it comes to explaining 
the price surge? Stock declines played only an indirect role for rice, biofuel 
demand seems to account quite well for maize stock declines, and trade 
and production shocks seem to explain some of the decline in wheat stocks. 
These factors suggest that declining stocks were largely caused by other 
factors rather than acting as a primary cause, although low stocks probably 
did exacerbate the price rise after the initial impetus, especially as market 
actors closely monitor stocks. Recent evidence collated by Abbott, Hurt, and 
Tyner (2009) also suggests that U.S. maize stocks in 2007 and 2008 were much 
higher than would have been predicted by the prices prevailing at the time 
(Figure 2.14). In conjunction with the evidence shown in Figure 2.13, it would 
appear that this crisis was not precipitated by stock declines.
  So in some contrast to Wiggins (2008) and other observers, our doubts 
regarding causation and the efficacy of stocks in managing the global food sys-
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Figure 2.14  Monthly maize prices relative to U.S. maize stocks, 
April 1996–December 2008
Source:   Calculations by Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2009).tem make us skeptical that declining stocks are a principal cause of the crisis. 
There are also legitimate reasons to think that larger stocks are not an impor-
tant part of the solution. Maintaining high levels of stocks is costly, multi-
lateral grain reserves suffer from weak incentives for participation, and trade 
liberalization is potentially a viable alternative to large international reserve 
systems. However, we leave this complex issue for future research.10
Decline of the U.S. Dollar
Some analyses have at least made passing mention of the weakening of the 
U.S. dollar over the past 6 years and have even analyzed the simple arith-
metical implications of depreciation for transmission of international prices 
into domestic prices. However, only one or two papers have also assessed the 
extent to which the depreciation of the dollar has had a causal impact on 
food prices, and, as noted above, the rise in commodity prices is much less 
when converted to euros.
  Why the U.S. dollar has depreciated as it has does not particularly concern 
us here, although the most obvious cause of the general decline is the large 
U.S. trade deficit and low real interest rates in the United States. Of more 
interest is how the depreciating dollar might have caused changes in food 
prices and in a broader range of commodity prices. Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 
(2008) make note of three crucial facts regarding these relationships.
  First, the patterns of commodity price changes and nominal exchange-
rate movements have been similar since 1970: when the dollar is weak, com-
modity prices are generally high, and when the dollar is strong, commodity 
prices decline (this pattern is also shown by the decline in food prices and 
the strengthening of the dollar since mid-2008). In the case of oil, the rela-
tionship has often been quite direct. A weakening U.S. dollar was one of the 
primary motivations for OPEC’s decision in 1974 to raise oil prices. In the 
current crisis the divergence between the dollar and many (but not all) other 
currencies is quite stark compared to previous increases in nominal dollar-
denominated food prices (such as during 1995–96). Second, the variations in 
commodity prices have always been greater than changes in exchange rates, 
which is especially true for the recent dollar depreciation. This phenomenon 
is perhaps due to the dampening effects of capital flows. And third, changes 
in agricultural commodity prices also appear to have lagged other commodity 
price changes, especially since 2002, so that recent high agricultural com-
modity prices are just now catching up with price increases for oil and metals 
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and <http://www.bufferstock.org/biblio.htm#trade>.that began earlier. This lag may be because the initial surge in demand for 
cereals was partly met through depletion of stocks, thus delaying the price 
change but perhaps making it sharper than would otherwise have been the 
case. In addition, there is the more important role of Chinese demand in price 
formation for nonfood commodities.
  As for the effects of the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, conversion to 
euros, for example, would cut off 20–30 percent of the nominal increase in 
U.S. dollar–denominated food prices (inflation rates in Europe and the United 
States have not diverged much, so conversion to real prices matters little). 
But is there also a causal effect? As Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) discuss, 
when the dollar weakens, agricultural exports—and particularly grain and 
oilseed exports—grow. Using USDA’s agricultural trade-weighted index of real 
foreign currency per unit of deflated dollars, they find that from 2002 to 2007 
the U.S. dollar depreciated 22 percent, and the value of agricultural exports 
increased 54 percent. Assuming that the United States is a large country in 
international agricultural markets—which it certainly is for maize, soybeans, 
and wheat—depreciation of the exchange rate should lead to higher prices 
in the United States but lower prices in the rest of the world, all else being 
equal. Previous research has indicated that a depreciation of the U.S. dol-
lar increases dollar commodity prices with an elasticity between 0.5 and 1.0 
(Gilbert 1989), and Mitchell (2008) calculates that the depreciation of the 
dollar has increased food prices by about 20 percent, assuming an elasticity 
of 0.75.
Low Real Interest Rates
Another theory that has been advanced in some quarters is that low real 
interest rates (Frankel, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c), especially in the United States, 
have caused a general price increase in a wide range of commodities (for a 
discussion of the theory, see Lustig 2008). The decision on whether to hold 
a commodity for the next period (in stocks or in the ground) or to sell it at 
the current price, invest the proceeds, and earn interest will depend on the 
interest rate and expectations about prices in the future. When interest 
rates are low, money flows out of interest-bearing instruments and into for-
eign currencies, emerging market stocks, other securities, and commodities, 
including food commodities. This portfolio shift drives the prices of these 
assets higher and higher until they reach a level where people perceive that 
they lie above their future long-term equilibrium level. Monetary policy 
therefore causes real commodity prices to rise more than other prices, 
because other prices are “sticky” (in other words, they rise at a lower rate). 
Because of the different rates of price adjustments and arbitrage conditions 
regarding price expectations and interest rates, commodity prices and other 
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provides econometric evidence in support of the inverse relationship between 
commodity prices and real interest rates in the United States dating back 
to the 1950s, and Frankel argues that more recent data points—before and 
after the commodity price peak in mid-2008—are consistent with historical 
evidence and the overshooting hypothesis.
  How consistent this theory is with the evidence is still questionable, how-
ever. Some commentators claim that a major inconsistency is that inventories 
are not high, but low. How true this observation is for metals and minerals 
is debatable, because part of the “inventory” of these commodities is in the 
ground, so that stocks for some of these commodities are not especially low 
(for example, oil). But agricultural stocks are low by historical standards. Of 
course, the data on stocks could be wrong or biased, because it is difficult to 
measure private stocks and because public reserves are influenced by policy 
decisions that may not be consistent with profit motives. Another caveat is 
that the diversion of assets from treasury bills and the like to commodities 
may have influenced agricultural futures prices, but as noted above, the jury 
is still out on the issue of whether futures prices affect spot prices. It is also 
difficult to distinguish between this channel of impact resulting from low 
interest rates and the effects of interest rates on exchange rates.
Speculation in Financial Markets
Various commentaries have suggested that commodity futures markets may 
have triggered the oil and food crises, and speculators have been denounced 
in the popular media and in high-level political circles. In fact, many of these 
discussions are themselves speculative, based on little theoretical reasoning or 
robust empirical evidence. The background to the speculation debate is that 
futures markets are relatively new to agriculture. For nearly a century, food 
markets have been organized around forward contracts between producers and 
buyers that reduce producers’ risks by providing a guaranteed future price. Over 
time, the forward contract market developed into a futures contract market 
consisting of forward contracts that can be traded as separate financial prod-
ucts on exchanges, the most important of which is the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) Futures Exchange. The reputed benefit of food securitization is that it 
facilitates hedging against risk and price discovery, because it allows buyers and 
sellers of agricultural commodities to indicate their expectations of price move-
ments. Futures prices therefore provide a benchmark for spot prices.
  Despite these benefits, there may be risks (CBC 2008). One area of concern 
is that, unlike forward contracts, futures contracts allow a variety of non-
commercial participants to partake in trade (that is, those who are not directly 
engaged in agricultural production, distribution, and delivery to markets). 
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the rules over who may trade in agricultural futures markets such that by 
2008, index funds’ participation in futures markets has grown by leaps and 
bounds: they accounted for about 40 percent of the futures contract trading 
in wheat, with smaller shares in maize (27.4 percent) and soybeans (20.8 per-
cent). The potential significance of this trend is that nontraditional partici-
pants can now speculate on food price trends, because the value of a futures 
contract varies in relationship to the commodity prices in the current spot 
market, much as bond prices vary in response to changing interest rates. This 
variation affords speculators an opportunity to bet on futures contracts as a 
separate asset class quite apart from the spot prices of agricultural commodi-
ties in today’s market. So a short futures position (involving contracts that 
function up to 6 months) protects against price decreases, whereas a long 
futures position (involving contracts of longer than 6 months) enables the 
holder to benefit from price increases in the longer term. Most commercial 
agricultural traders play in the short futures market, because it is critical to 
the fundamentals of agriculture and decisions on agricultural production and 
delivery. Most noncommercial players (that is, financial intermediaries) play 
in the long-term market of contract price expectations. Hence, measures 
of speculative activity typically focus on long positions, or the share of long 
positions taken by index funds.
  Proponents of the speculation hypothesis must establish theoretical and 
empirical linkages between speculation and futures prices, and between 
futures prices and spot prices. This is no easy task. Sanders and Irwin (2010) 
review theory and evidence. They suggest three logical inconsistencies in the 
arguments made by bubble proponents as well as five instances where the 
bubble story is not consistent with observed facts. The first problem is that 
money flows are not the same as demand. With equally informed market 
participants, there is no limit to the number of futures contracts that can be 
created at a given price level. These contracts are essentially just bets on 
future prices, so why should a bet affect an actual price outcome? Second, 
although theoretical models show that uninformed/noise traders can drive a 
wedge between market prices and fundamental values, index fund buying is 
very transparent, so it seems highly unlikely that other large rational traders 
would hesitate to trade against an index fund if they were driving prices away 
from fundamental values. Third, speculation is not excessive when correctly 
compared to hedging demands.
  Fourth, index investors do not participate in the futures delivery process 
or in the cash market; nor do they engage in the purchase or hoarding of the
cash commodity (Headey and Fan 2008). However, Gilbert (2010) argues that 
increased long futures positions could be viewed as a positive shock to inven-
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pants that prices will rise. This last linkage is perhaps the most important, 
but it is also contentious, because stocks have been declining during 2005–08. 
Gilbert (2010) suggests that in the short term stocks are largely a postharvest 
residual rather than a conscious decision. If stocks are therefore fixed in 
the short term, suppliers may raise prices rather than hoard. Although this 
assumption may be somewhat extreme (stocks may be neither fixed nor fully 
adjustable), it makes the question largely an empirical one. However, in the 
next subsection we show that U.S. wheat stocks were depleted by foreign 
demand, which would seem to constitute a real shock rather than one related 
to futures market activities.
  Fifth, if index fund buying drove commodity prices higher, then markets 
without index funds should not have seen prices advance. Headey and Fan 
(2008) caution against directly comparing commodity markets selected for 
futures contracts—because they may have characteristics that exacerbate 
volatility, such as relatively inelastic supply and demand—to those commodi-
ties without futures markets. But with that caveat in mind, Headey and Fan 
(2008) cite the rapid increases in the prices for nonsecuritized commodities 
(such as rubber, onions, and iron ore) as evidence that rapid inflation occurred 
in commodities without futures markets. Similarly, Sanders and Irwin (2010) 
show that the size of index fund investments in different markets does not 
predict market returns. For example, futures markets with the highest con-
centration of index fund positions (livestock markets) showed little or no 
increase, whereas those markets with the smallest index fund participation 
(grains and oilseeds) saw the largest price increases.
  More generic tests, however, do find an econometric linkage between 
futures market activities and spot market prices. Robles and Cooke (2009) use 
monthly CBOT data to test whether lagged proxies for speculative activity in 
the CBOT (for example, various ratios of noncommercial activities relative to 
total activities) predict changes in spot prices. They conduct 23 tests based on 
four commodities and six proxies for speculative activity. They find evidence 
of Granger causality in 6 of the 23 tests. Gilbert (2010) also tests the impacts 
of futures market activity on spot prices, although he uses different depen-
dent and independent variables. His dependent variable is the IMF’s index of 
agricultural food prices, whereas the independent variables measured with 
monthly data from March 2006 to June 2009 are oil prices, an exchange rate 
index, and an index of futures positions on 12 major U.S. agricultural futures 
markets constructed from the data in the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission’s Supplementary Commitments of Traders Reports. Gilbert (2010) 
tests both contemporaneous and lagged variables and treats oil prices and 
futures positions as endogenous, chiefly being determined by deeper factors, 
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use commodity prices to expose themselves to Chinese growth and to hedge 
against exchange rate movements). He finds that futures positions have a 
large effect on food prices.
  Although this descriptive and econometric evidence seems superficially 
compelling, it is quite difficult to construe causality from it. Part of the recent 
comovement between rising spot prices and rising futures prices comes about 
because financial speculation through securitization is most profitable when 
there is substantial volatility in the underlying markets. When markets are 
flat, futures contracts tend merely to reflect the discounted future value at 
today’s prices. But when markets are in turmoil, expectations of future prices 
may vary considerably (CBC 2008). Thus speculation may be more a symptom 
than a cause of underlying volatility. And because expectations play a role in 
futures markets (by definition), Granger-causality tests based on time lags (as 
in Robles and Cooke 2009) may not be indicative of causation, especially in 
the absence of a full set of other control variables. Indeed, this “Christmas 
cards Granger-cause Christmas” problem is a well-known fallacy in time series 
econometric work (Atukeren 2008). Gilbert’s (2010) results, however, are only 
as good as his instruments. Of particular concern is that such instruments as 
Chinese economic growth and stock market performance may not be validly 
excluded from the equation explaining agricultural prices. Of course, by the 
same token these caveats on the evidence do not mean that the evidence is 
wrong, only that the jury is still out.
Trade Shocks: Export Restrictions, Import Surges, and Droughts
Export restrictions and import surges are widely regarded as an especially 
potent explanation for the sharp increase in rice prices, although Headey 
(2010) finds evidence of important trade shocks in wheat and maize markets 
as well. Even so, there are several reasons why rice markets are vulnerable 
to shocks. Rice itself is unusual in having relatively weak substitution effects 
with other cereals, being mostly produced by smallholders, constituting 
a large proportion of the diets of millions of people, and being very thinly 
traded (IRRI 2008; Timmer 2009). Hence, for political reasons, very few Asian 
governments are willing to tolerate significant increases in rice prices, and 
many countries have permanent trade distortions applying to rice. Indeed, 
the notoriously thin trade in rice, with global imports constituting less than 
10 percent of all rice consumption, partly explains why international rice 
prices have always been more volatile than other prices and much more vola-
tile than domestic rice prices.
  Rice is therefore quite clearly a special case relative to other grains. 
Indeed, from August 2005 until November 2007 rice prices increased steadily 
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rice markets were avoiding the price surge being witnessed in other cereal 
markets. But from November 2007 to May 2008 they increased by a further 
140 percent (Figure 2.15). This rise was despite production reaching an all-
time high in 2007 and fairly stable rice stocks (with the exception of China, 
which held excessive stocks prior to their reduction and is not a major trader 
of rice).
  What appeared to prompt this remarkable surge in international prices is 
the export restrictions imposed on the Indian and Vietnamese rice markets in 
October and November 2007. According to USDA,11 Vietnam placed a partial 
ban on new sales because it had oversold in the global market and the govern-
ment was concerned about rising domestic food prices. Headey (2010) shows 
that there was also increasing demand for Indian rice exports, which he ties 
to the run-up in wheat prices, because many major rice importers are also 
major wheat importers. To make matters worse, a poor wheat harvest put 
pressure on India’s Public Distribution Scheme, which relies on both wheat 
and rice stocks. Although the action prompted protest by rice producers and 
the academic community (Gulati and Gupta 2007), the Indian government 
initially argued that its responsibility was to its own poor rather than to its 
neighbors. However, the worst direct impacts of this decision—rice shortages 
in India’s largest export market, Bangladesh—were eventually averted in April 
2008, when India decided to make concessions to Bangladesh by selling their 
smaller neighbor 500,000 tons of rice at prices less than half of those prevail-
ing in international markets at the time.
  The concessionary act probably averted a humanitarian disaster in Ban-
gladesh, but it did not undo the panic that ensued in international markets, 
especially as India is often the world’s second largest rice exporter. In early 
2008 further export restrictions were imposed by Vietnam, Cambodia, and 
Egypt. Panic buying, or precautionary demand, was also important. The 
Philippines, one of the largest net importers of rice, engaged in panic buy-
ing, importing 1.3 million tons of rice in just the first 4 months of 2008—an 
amount that exceeded its entire import bill for 2007. These actions exac-
erbated the crisis, and the price surge continued until May. In May Slayton 
and Timmer (2008) proposed that China, Japan, and Thailand could solve 
the crisis by releasing excess rice stocks. In Japan most of this excess rice 
has accumulated because of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules requiring 
Japan to import rice from overseas. But most of this imported rice is used 
as feed grain. In late May 2008 Japan promised to release 300,000 tons of rice 
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were never actually released to developing Asian markets (Nakamoto and 
Landingin 2008).12 Whether this information had an effect is difficult to tell 
—at the same time oil prices also plummeted, as did other commodity prices, 
while the U.S. dollar also strengthened. In any event the rice bubble burst in 
June 2008, and rice prices fell precipitously.
  The size of these trade shocks can be discerned by comparing annual 
changes in exports and imports from leading market actors in the rice mar-
ket. Figures 2.16 and 2.17 show that 2007/08 saw major reductions in Indian 
and Vietnamese exports and surges in imports from Bangladesh, Philippines, 
and energy-exporting countries flush with foreign reserves. Incorporating 
these shocks into some back-of-the-envelope calculations based on short-run 
supply and demand elasticities, Headey (2010) calculates that export restric-
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Figure 2.15  Effects of export restrictions on rice prices
Source:   Headey (2010), based on the collation of various media articles and USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service reports.
Note:   Price is for Thailand A1 variety.
12 This information is anecdotal, but certainly USDA data do not indicate any increase in Japa-





















Figure 2.16  Decomposing annual changes in rice exports before and 
after the crisis
Source:   Headey (2010).
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tions and demand surges accounted for virtually all of the increase in rice 
prices; Mitra and Josling (2009) reach fairly similar conclusions regarding the 
effect of India’s export restrictions.
  Export restrictions and panic buying were probably less important for 
other major staples because the export markets of most of these staples are 
heavily dominated by countries that have not imposed restrictions (Australia, 
Canada, the E.U., and the United States). Nevertheless, Headey (2010) shows 
that there were major demand surges and supply-side shocks in wheat mar-
kets, and even in maize markets, for which the biofuel explanation tends to 
dominate.
  The case of wheat is striking because of the important interplay between 
weather shocks and trade restrictions. Most spectacularly, Australian wheat 
production was 50–60 percent below trend growth rates in two successive 
years (2005–06). As a counterseasonal southern hemisphere exporter, it is 
quite possible that the Australian drought had a particularly sharp effect on 
prices, especially given that the United States also experienced a poor harvest 
(some 14 percent lower than the previous year), and more modest declines also characterized Russian and Ukrainian production. Dollive (2008) regards 
Ukraine’s export ban (later modified to an export restriction) as the most 
critical of these bans. He shows that Ukrainian grain exports in 2007 were 77 
percent lower than in 2006. Dollive (2008) also reports that many of Ukraine’s 
largest grain clients switched entirely to other grain markets, such as those 
of Argentina, Australia, France, North America, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The 
last two countries are particularly relevant, because Ukraine’s export ban 
increased demand for Russian and Kazakh grain exports, which resulted in 
greater price pressure in these markets, including the halving of stocks-to-use 
ratios. By early 2008, Russia and Kazakhstan had both implemented export 
restraints to protect prices in their domestic markets. Hence, as with rice, 
there was a clear contagion effect. Argentina also began to indirectly restrict 
exports by closing its exports registry in March 2007, although this action only 
slowed exports later in the year as existing registrations began to expire (Dol-
live 2008). However, in November 2007, the Argentine government raised its 
export taxes on wheat (to 28 percent), before reopening and then reclosing 
the exports registry in January and February.
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Figure 2.17  Decomposing annual changes in rice imports before and 
after the crisis
Source:   Headey (2010).  The effects of these export restrictions in India, Ukraine, Argentina, Rus-
sia, and Kazakhstan also seem to be apparent in descriptive data (1, 2, and 4 
in Figure 2.18). Ukraine imposed fairly tight export quotas as early as the sec-
ond half of 2006 when monthly exports dropped by two-thirds. India imposed 
an export ban in February 2007, and then in late June Ukraine announced new 
export quotas that virtually imposed a complete export ban, so that from July 
2007 to March 2008 Ukraine scarcely exported any wheat. Drought in Austra-
lia significantly reduced the wheat crop there, and Europe’s combination of 
too much rain in France and Germany and too little rain in Eastern Europe 
resulted in reduced exports in the second half of 2007.
  These events coincided with U.S. wheat prices rising by 70 percent from 
April to August 2007 and a surge in demand for U.S. wheat exports. In August 
U.S. wheat exports doubled from their July level of 2.2 million tons to reach 
4.4 million tons in August and September 2007 (4 in Figure 2.18). The August–
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7. Jul–Aug: exports up 1.75 mmt:
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IDN   0.2 Nigeria   0.18.
Re-stocking?
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65% of that is to Egypt.
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1. Poor harvests lead to export
quotas in Ukraine (late 2006) and
export ban in India (Feb 2007). 
3. Apr–Aug: prices up
by 70%, or US$140.
6. Oct 07–Feb 08:
prices rise 45%, or
another US$146.
Figure 2.18  Wheat exports: Droughts, export restrictions, price 
increases, and import surges
Source:   Headey (2010).
Notes:   The wheat price relates to U.S. Wheat No. 2, Hard Red Winter, but trends for the soft 
red are very similar. ARG, Argentina; IDN, Indonesia; KZK, Kazakhstan; MENA, Middle 
East and North Africa; MEX, Mexico; mmt, millions of metric tons; RUS, Russia.September surge was principally fueled by an increase of 1.2 million tons of 
exports to the MENA region (55 percent of the total surge); two-thirds of this 
1.2 million tons went to Egypt alone. Other regions (South Asia, East Asia, 
South America, Africa, the E.U.) each increased their demand for U.S. wheat 
exports by about 0.15–0.22 million tons each. Overall, wheat prices increased 
by 72 percent from trough to peak, and Headey (2010) suggests a ballpark 
estimate that trade shocks increased prices by about 44 percent. He sug-
gests that about half (48 percent) of this increase was due to the Australian 
drought, roughly one-third was due to Ukraine’s export restrictions, and 19 
percent to the E.U.’s poor harvests and subsequent drop in wheat exports.
  Trade shocks have scarcely been discussed in the context of maize 
markets, where biofuel-based explanations dominate. Nevertheless, Dol-
live  (2008) documents how China—typically the world’s third largest maize 
exporter—began to indirectly restrict exports in the second half of 2007.13 
As a result, Chinese maize exports declined significantly, and China stopped 
exporting grain to its largest client, South Korea, as well as to other impor-
tant customers (such as Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia). These countries 
had to turn to other international markets for maize, principally the United 
States. The shift to U.S. maize was not inconsequential. South Korea alone 
accounted for 6.9 percent of U.S. maize exports in the first five months of 
2007, but this number rose to 15.5 percent in 2008. Although the effect of 
China’s restriction on maize exports is still low compared to the surge in 
demand for biofuels from within the United States, China’s actions certainly 
exacerbated an already tight market.
  However, Headey (2010) shows that there were demand pressures on U.S. 
maize markets even in 2006 and 2007. Figure 2.19 reports monthly maize 
export and price data for the U.S. market. The figure shows that not only did 
U.S. maize exports surge twice in recent years—from March to May 2006 and 
from August to November 2007—but that these two import surges preceded 
two large price surges. The first export surge involved a 2 million ton (or 54 
percent) increase, which was followed by a 59 percent price increase. The 
second (3 million ton or 65 percent) export surge from August to November 
2007 preceded a 75 percent increase in prices that took place from Septem-
ber 2007 to May 2008. So as with rice and wheat markets, Headey (2010) 
again finds large export surges preceding price surges.
  However, it remains puzzling as to why these surges took place, espe-
cially as trade-diversion effects are not so obvious. Even though South Korea 
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13 Specifically, China stopped issuing new export quotas for maize in the second half of 2007. In 
December 2007 China also removed the rebate on value-added taxes for major grain exports and 
imposed export taxes on grains and grain powders (typically 10 percent).and Japan played some role in these surges, Mexico and the MENA coun-
tries played much larger roles. Hence China’s export restrictions, and their 
impact on Japanese and South Korean trade, seem to be only a small part 
of the story. The other countries involved are something of a puzzle. Mexico 
basically imports U.S. maize for feed use, but given the important of domes-
tic maize in the Mexican diet, future research should look at substitution 
effects more closely. As for the MENA region, there is no particular evidence 
of panic, although poor weather seems to have characterized some of the 
region. Another factor to consider is the large foreign exchange reserves of 
many importing countries, which would suggest that imports were simply 
unconstrained.
  In summary, the evidence reported in Headey (2010) and Dollive (2008) 
suggests that various trade shocks—export restrictions, demand surges, and 
bad weather—were more important short-term factors than previous analyses 
had suggested. Trade shocks seem to account almost entirely for the surge 
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Figure 2.19  Surges in demand for U.S. maize exports precede maize 
price surges
Source:   Headey (2010).
Notes:   The maize price relates to U.S. Maize No. 2, Yellow. ARG, Argentina; IDN, Indonesia; 
KOR, South Korea; MENA, Middle East and North Africa; MEX, Mexico; mmt, millions of 
metric tons; SSA, Sub-Saharan Africa.in rice prices (along with deeper spillovers from other commodities, such as 
wheat and oil markets) and could perhaps account for as much as half of the 
increase in wheat prices. They may even have played an important role in 
maize markets.
Summary of the Causes and a Model of a “Near-Perfect Storm”
Only two studies to date have considered all factors with sufficient rigor: the 
studies by Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) and by Mitchell (2008). Mitchell 
alone was bold enough to give some rough estimates of the contribution of 
each cause to the overall rise in food prices. An encouraging feature of both 
these analyses is that they are in broad agreement, although Abbott, Hurt, 
and Tyner (2008) stress the importance of the weakened dollar somewhat 
more than does Mitchell (2008). Although we extend the evidence in several 
regards, our own appraisal also offers similar conclusions and supporting evi-
dence. These points of consensus are as follows.
  First, all three studies emphasize growing demand, but they attribute it 
mostly to demand from the biofuels industry for maize and, to a lesser extent, 
for oilseeds. None of the three studies could find any substantial increase in 
demand from China and India, except in the case of soybeans (although this 
trend started many years ago), and in the case of demand for fuel (although 
China’s and India’s increasing demands are not necessarily the dominant 
explanation for rising oil prices). However, unlike the other two studies, we 
emphasize short-term demand surges from an array of countries as a signifi-
cant determinant of tighter international cereal markets.
  Second, all three studies emphasize higher energy prices, but Abbott, Hurt, 
and Tyner (2008) emphasize that the main effect of rising energy prices was 
to make biofuels more profitable, rather than agricultural production more 
expensive (that is, it was a demand-side effect). Mitchell (2008) estimates that 
oil prices had a supply-side effect that accounts for about 15–20 percent of the 
food price increase, but we find that (1) agriculture is much more oil-intensive 
than is production in other sectors, which generally rely on other forms of 
energy, and (2) oil-related production costs on U.S. farms have risen by almost 
40 percent of revenues. How much of these increased production costs are 
passed on to prices is difficult to say, but we suggest that Mitchell’s (2008) 
estimate is probably too low. We also emphasize that rising oil prices, the 
weaker dollar, and the influx of foreign exchange reserves for energy-exporting 
countries significantly strengthened their demand for U.S. cereals.
  Third, the studies by Mitchell (2008) and Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) 
go further than other analysts in emphasizing the effects of dollar deprecia-
tion. Mitchell (2008) suggests this effect accounts for another 20 percent of 
the rise in food prices by sustaining international demand even as nominal 
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main difference between the current price surge and the 1995–96 price surge 
—which did not constitute a crisis—is the marked depreciation of the dollar 
this time around. The strengthening of the dollar since mid-2008 and the 
commensurate fall in food prices seem to support this association.
  Finally, all three analyses emphasize that rice is almost certainly a special 
case, given the sensitivity of rice prices to export restrictions, and all empha-
size that a series of poor wheat harvests at least made matters worse.
  One area of ongoing contention is the role of stocks: some authors cite 
lower stocks as a potentially driving factor, while others view low stocks as a 
symptom of the crisis more than a cause. Causality undoubtedly runs both ways 
with stocks. We have shown that excluding China and the former USSR coun-
tries leads to much more modest declines in grain stocks that occur fairly late 
in the game, which suggests that stocks were driven down by surging demand 
and some poor harvests. However, low stocks can certainly make matters 
worse, as market actors use stocks ratios to form their price expectations.
  Our own basic model of the food crisis is summarized in Figure 2.20. In 
this figure we also note those factors that we regard as key drivers of surging 
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Figure 2.20  Summary model of the principal causes of the crisis: 
A near-perfect storm
Source:   Constructed by the authors.
Notes:   Boxes in gray denote less significant, crop-specific causes. The decline of the U.S. 
dollar and the rise in oil prices are shown together because they are universal factors 
that may be causally related.food prices. First, there is no consistent evidence to date that speculation 
has contributed to the crisis, and what evidence there is does not show that 
it was a primary cause of the crisis. Second, we have omitted stocks from 
the main model. As with speculation, we find it very difficult to view stock 
declines as a primary cause of the crisis rather than merely a symptom of 
rising demand (for maize and soybeans) and weak production (of wheat). 
Instead the dominant factors consist of a set of interlinked cross-commodity 
factors—a weakening U.S. dollar, rising oil prices, and the consequent surge 
in biofuel demand—as well as two or three commodity-specific explanations. 
In general the complexity of this model supports the description advanced 
by the director of the World Food Programme (WFP) that the current crisis 
constitutes a perfect storm.
  Finally, it is worth emphasizing the dynamic processes that have led to 
this crisis. In general, economists point to the efficacy of markets in smooth-
ing out price volatility. Increasing demand should lead to increasing prices, 
which should result in a supply response, which should then lead to lower 
prices. Conversely, decreasing supply should lead to higher prices, which 
should prompt consumers to switch to substitutes. The remarkable surge 
in prices in 2007 and 2008 begs the question of why markets were not self-
correcting, or more specifically, why they did not self-correct until mid-2008. 
Our review points to some interesting explanations of why prices kept rising 
before eventually being checked by external events (the global financial 
crisis) and the inherently unsustainable nature of the price bubble. We par-
ticularly emphasize why the markets did not self-correct. That is, why did not 
demand decrease more and supply increase more as prices started to rise?
  Several factors explain this anomaly. On the supply side, production is 
seasonal and may only respond to price rises with some lag. Bad luck was 
also an issue, with 2006–07 witnessing some weather shocks, which in turn 
contributed to export restrictions, which rippled across other markets as con-
suming nations switched to less restricted markets. On the demand side, the 
biofuels sector sustained maize demand because of ongoing high oil prices. 
Strong economic growth and large foreign reserves also made importing 
nations less sensitive to the initial price rises. In addition, in some instances 
importing countries seemed to panic. The peculiar nature of the rice market 
made precautionary purchases and hoarding a high priority for households, 
producers, and traders. For these reasons high prices were not immediately 
countered by reduced demand or increased supply, with both market and 
government failures contributing to these outcomes.
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Consequences of the Crisis
S
everal factors suggest that the recent surge in food prices had—and 
may still be having—a severe impact on the poorer populations of the 
world. The large number of food riots in diverse locations around the 
developing world, beggar-thy-neighbor policies that not only increase prices 
but also restrict physical access to food, increased dependence of many poor 
countries on food imports, and expectations that both food and oil prices 
will stay high for many years to come are all factors that seem to justify the 
utmost concern for the food security and broader well-being of the poor. 
Moreover, the evidence of large household surveys since the 1970s generally 
indicates that food prices will have a negative impact on the welfare of not 
just urban areas, because many rural poor in developing countries are also 
net food consumers (World Bank 2008b). These facts have prompted some 
development agencies to suggest that rising food prices plunge millions more 
into poverty and deepen poverty still further for those already struggling 
(World Bank 2008a).
  However, all these assumptions and predictions require much closer exami-
nation and often significant qualification. The group most vulnerable to rising 
food prices is still the urban poor, but this group is also the most vociferous 
(Bezemer and Headey 2008). Thus protests may be evidence of suffering, but 
not of “net suffering”: price changes always create winners and losers. More-
over, judging who is negatively affected requires accurate data and careful 
analysis of food dependency, poverty/vulnerability, and price changes at 
both the micro and macro levels. A great deal of progress has already been 
made in these endeavors, especially in microsimulation work, but a large gap 
still exists between micro- and macroassessments of the consequences of the 
crisis. A further distinction must also be made between the short and long 
terms. In the short term the adjustment costs of responding to rapid price 
changes may be prohibitively high and painfully slow. But even in the long 
term the ability of the poor to make adjustments depends on their access to 
productive assets and on national and international policies aimed at raising 
agricultural output or successfully pursuing other strategies to increase food 
54security. This chapter does not remotely attempt to fill in all the gaps, but it 
does provide some conceptual analysis and a review of existing findings and 
key data.
From International Markets to Household Welfare: 
An Analytical Framework
The effect of rising international food prices on the welfare of individuals is 
complex and highly heterogeneous across both household types and countries. 
Figure 3.1 depicts eight steps through which international prices influence 
household welfare. Pertinent policy questions are listed outside each box.
Although surprisingly complex, Figure 3.1 is still a simplification of the pro-
cess by which rising international prices affect individual welfare. Our aim 
is to flesh out some of the additional complications in the discussion below. 
In the figure boxes 1–4 largely refer to macroeconomic effects, whereas boxes 
5–8 mostly refer to microeconomic responses that depend on the endow-
ments and behavior of individual producers and consumers. Most macro-
economic studies focus on the areas listed in boxes 1–4 (a few focus on the 
substitution effects of box 5), and most microeconomic studies focus on 
boxes 6–8. This dichotomy is unfortunate, because it is by no means clear 
that countries that are vulnerable in a microeconomic sense (that is, those 
with high rates of poverty and hunger) are automatically vulnerable in a 
macroeconomic sense (having high import bills, low reserves, and high rates 
of transmission) and vice versa. Identifying the most vulnerable countries, 
which we do later in this chapter, necessitates an examination of both the 
micro and macro sides of the food-security equation.
Macroeconomic Impacts
Many recent impact studies refer solely to food prices, but any comprehen-
sive assessment of current poverty trends needs to incorporate changes in a 
range of prices, including fuel costs and fertilizers. Oil prices in particular 
will have a pervasive effect on a country’s vulnerability to the current crisis 
through their effect on exchange rates, foreign reserves, transport costs, 
and domestic inflation. For these reasons the most relevant macroeconomic 
assessments of the crisis incorporate the effects of rising oil prices. Particu-
larly useful in this regard is a recent IMF (2008a) assessment of oil and food 
price increases.
Import Bills
The first question to ask is how changes in all commodity prices will affect 
a country’s macroeconomy. We therefore need to distinguish each country’s 
position vis-à-vis their net import position with respect to food, oil, and other 
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(FAO) classifies 82 developing countries as low-income, food-deficit countries 
based on four criteria. The two main criteria are (1) the country must be a 
low- or middle-income country according to the World Bank’s classification 
and (2) the country must have an aggregate calorie-based food deficit in the 
sense that national food demand exceeds its production. It would appear 
that many developing countries are dependent on food imports and that the 
impacts of rising food prices will indeed be almost pervasively severe. More-
over it has been widely noted that dependency on imports appears to have 
increased in recent decades.
  Yet the conclusion that poor countries have become heavily dependent on 
food imports needs significant qualification. For example, Gürkan, Balcombe,
and Prakash (2003) calculate food-import bills from 1970 to 2001 for net food-
importing developing countries and for LDCs. On average, they find that
developing countries have become more dependent on food imports for con-
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Figure 3.1  Transmission from international markets to households and 
individual welfare
Source:   Constructed by the authors.sumption (although prior to 2001, at least, the ability to pay for these imports 
had increased among the net food-importing developing countries but declined 
among the LDCs).
  However, Aksoy and Ng (2008) give a more nuanced picture. They recal-
culate both food and general agricultural net import bills for low-, middle-, 
and high-income countries, but they disaggregate within each category by oil 
exporters, conflict states, small islanders, and “normal” countries. The key 
findings of their study are as follows. First, once the three special groups are 
omitted, the average low- or middle-income country has gone from being a 
net food importer in 1980/81 to being a net food exporter in 2004/05. How-
ever, Africa still contains a large number of oil exporters and conflict states, 
as well as other exceptions, meaning that most African countries (35 of 47) 
are still net importers of food, even though most are also net exporters of all 
agricultural goods (32 of 47). Third, only six low-income countries have food 
deficits that are more than 10 percent of their imports, so most net food-
importing developing countries are marginal net food importers. Finally, Aksoy 
and Ng (2008) also identify countries with considerable potential to switch 
from being net exporters of nonfood agricultural products to net exporters of 
food. Of course, this switch is much less relevant to the short-term impacts 
of the crisis, because switching from cash crops to food production takes a 
considerable amount of time and may be prohibitively costly.
  So the basic message from Aksoy and Ng (2008) is that the severity of food 
dependence is often overstated. For these reasons one might regard the rise 
in oil prices as a more serious threat to macroeconomic stability in develop-
ing countries. Indeed, oil import costs are 2.5 times larger than food imports 
for low-income countries and twice as large for middle-income countries. 
Consistent with this observation, IMF (2008a) simulations confirm that in the 
absence of policy responses, the impacts of oil prices are considerably larger 
than those of increases in food prices. The study estimates that for 33 net
food-importing countries with available data, the adverse balance-of-
payments impact of the increase in food prices from January 2007 to April 
2008 is 0.5 percent of 2007 annual GDP (US$2.3 billion, or 0.2 months of 2008 
imports of goods and services). During the same period, the impact of the 
increase in oil prices in 59 net oil-importing countries is estimated to be 2.2 
percent of GDP (US$35.8 billion, or 0.7 months of 2008 imports of goods and 
services). Moreover, IMF (2008a) also finds that further oil price increases 
in 2008 and 2009 would have had much larger adverse effects on foreign 
reserves than would equal rises in food prices (see Table 3.1). As it turns out, 
both oil and food prices have declined since mid-2008.
  Finally, although we have no data on overall terms-of-trade movements 
that factor into other commodities, we know that many net exporters of 
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extent (for example, Zambia), as have countries that are net exporters of 
labor to oil-producing countries (South Asian countries and Philippines; see 
Rosen and Shapouri 2008). Indeed, the estimates of terms-of-trade trends 
from the IMF (2009a) show that African economies have done well overall as 
a result of the commodities boom, so much so that the end of the commodi-
ties boom (that is, the 2009 financial crisis) will likely hurt their balance of 
payments more than the food crisis did. From this perspective it appears that 
the food crisis was not a macroeconomic crisis in the majority of countries. 
Of course, the story at the household level is likely to be quite different.
Exchange Rate Movements
As noted in Chapter 2, several currencies have appreciated against the U.S. 
dollar, the currency in which food and oil exports prices are usually denomi-
nated. The distribution of both nominal and real measures are presented in 
Figure 3.2 for the percentage change in exchange rates from the first quarter 
of 2002 to the second quarter of 2008, a period that covers the major move-
ments of the U.S. dollar as well as the rise in oil and food prices. The distri-
bution of nominal movements is centered around a median of a little more 
than 20 percent, but the distribution is also highly bimodal because of three 
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Table 3.1  Number of countries severely affected by food and oil price 
increases, 2007–08
  Number of  Number of
  low-income countries  middle-income countries 
Type of shocka  severely affected  severely affected
Severe negative shocks
  Oil price shock  48  33
  Food price shock  13  3
  Combined shocks  42  30
Positive shocks
  Oil price shock  11  23
  Food price shock  30  28
  Combined shocks  23  23
Less-than-adequate reserves
  Before the combined shocks  30  18
  After the oil price increase  37  26
  After the food price increase  27  19
  After the combined shocks  37  25
    Total countries  74  71
Source:   IMF (2008a).
aSevere negative shocks are defined as those that induce drops in reserves of more than 0.5 
months of imports. Positive shocks are those that result in increased reserves.currency unions. The euro area and the West African franc zone (which is 
pegged to the euro) have appreciated against the U.S. dollar by some 80 per-
cent during this period. Thus the adverse effects of rising commodity imports 
for many West African countries should, all else being equal, be limited from 
a macroeconomic perspective. In contrast, the Central American and Carib-
bean area, which consists of currencies largely pegged to the U.S. dollar, and 
quite a large number of other countries around the world have experienced 
a stable rate of exchange with the dollar, while a few countries have experi-
enced depreciation. Real exchange rate movements are still centered around 
a positive mean, but the distribution is slightly less bimodal, with only the 
euro area still standing out as a clear group, as variation in inflation rates 
across euro countries is quite limited. In either case it is clear that although 
most countries have appreciated against the dollar, considerable variation 
remains in terms of countries’ vulnerability to rising dollar-denominated food 
and oil prices.
  Of course, countries do not need to buy food imports in U.S. dollars. A 
country can buy food imports from other regions or, in principle, convert 
to euros, for example. One way to judge how much cheaper it would be to 
import from non–U.S. suppliers of food staples is to examine trends in the 
USDA commodity-specific, trade-weighted U.S.–dollar exchange rate, which 
shows movements of the U.S. dollar against U.S. agricultural competitors. 









































Figure 3.2  Histograms of exchange rate appreciations against the 
U.S. dollar, Q1 2002–Q2 2008
Sources:   Calculations by the authors using data from IMF (2008b) for Figure 3.2a (covering 124 
countries) and from USDA (2008c) for Figure 3.2b (covering 95 countries).
Note:   Q1 and Q2 are the first and second quarters of the year, respectively.This index indicates that export prices denominated in the currencies of other 
exporters of maize, wheat, and rice have declined by about 15–17 percent 
(relative to dollar-denominated prices) from 2002 to 2008.
  In many instances, however, there is relatively little opportunity for coun-
tries to switch suppliers. First, countries that peg their currency to the U.S. 
dollar will generally have experienced the same depreciation that the dollar 
experienced. Second, variations in transport costs are still a significant cost 
of trade. Third, variations in trade patterns determine the composition of 
foreign exchange reserves for countries, so limited trade with other countries 
also limits foreign exchange capacity. A country might earn foreign reserves 
in euros, for example, but might want to purchase cereals from the United 
States in dollars. This limited room for maneuver vis-à-vis food supplies sug-
gests that we should investigate the relationship between dependency on U.S. 
food imports and exchange rate movements, because countries that are both 
dependent on the United States and have not benefited from appreciation 
against the dollar may be particularly vulnerable in a macroeconomic sense.
  Table 3.2 reports data for the two largest U.S. cereal exports, wheat 
and maize, as well as real exchange rate movements and foreign reserves, 
for regions and selected countries. Unsurprisingly, the regions that are most 
dependent on the United States as a source of food imports are Central 
America, the Caribbean, and some of the more northern countries of South 
America. A few other countries and regions are fairly dependent on the 
United States for food imports, but there are strong mitigating circumstances 
in most cases. First, many of these countries are either wealthy or only major 
consumers of U.S. wheat, whereas Central America, the Caribbean, and some 
South American countries consume both U.S. wheat and U.S. maize. The 
second mitigating factor is currency appreciation. In Africa the only country 
seriously dependent on U.S. food imports is Nigeria, but its currency appreci-
ated by 42 percent in real terms against the U.S. dollar, and of course it is 
benefiting substantially from increased oil revenues.
  As for foreign exchange reserves, the IMF has calculated months of 
imports as of the first quarter of 2008. Disconcertingly, the Caribbean and 
Central American countries appear to be highly vulnerable in this dimension 
as well. (In Africa some discrepancy exists between oil and non-oil export-
ers, but there is variation in both groups, suggesting that mineral exporting 
capacity alone does not wholly explain the status of reserves—policies mat-
ter more.) This evidence therefore suggests that, so far, it is the Central 
American and Caribbean countries that have been most vulnerable to rising 
U.S. dollar–denominated export prices because of their dependence on U.S. 
exports and their lack of any major compensating currency movements.
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Table 3.2  Dependence on U.S. imports, appreciation against the U.S. dollar, 
and reserve status
     Real 
     appreciation   
  U.S. wheat  U.S. maize  against  Foreign 
  imports  imports   U.S. dollar,  reserves, 2008
 (percent  (percent  2002–08 (months  of
Country or region  consumption)  consumption)  (percent change)  imports)
Middle East and   2  15  20  15.0
  North Africa 
Caribbean 28  36  15  3.5
Dominican Republic  46  49  12  2.6
Haiti 26  n.a.  5a 3.0
Trinidad and Tobago  48  95  18  n.a.
Jamaica 26  100  15  4.1
Central America  45  24  10  3.5
Costa Rica  55  47  10  n.a.
El Salvador  31  21  8  3.2
Guatemala 46  20  26  4.1
Honduras 45  21  12  3.5
Mexico 20  13  –2 3.7
Nicaragua 46  9 4  1.7
Panama 44  80  0  4.1
South America  4  1  25  8.7
Colombia 23  31  41  6.3
Ecuador 9  23  8  2.5
Peru 9  6  20  15.5
Venezuela 27  22  –12 n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa  10  0  40  7.0
Non–oil-producing         5.0
  countries       
Ghana 10  0  35  2.2
Nigeria 42  0  42  20.6
East Asia  2  7  1  n.a.
Hong Kong  1  49  –21 n.a.
Japan 26  90  2  n.a.
Republic of Korea  16  28  15  n.a.
South Asia  0.3  0.4  22  5.6 (4.0)b
Southeast Asia  12  1  25  6.0
Thailand 19  0  30  7.1
Philippines 32 0  29  6.3
Sources:   Calculations by the authors using data from USDA (2008c) for imports and from IMF (2008b) for 
exchange rates.
Note:   n.a., data not available.
aOnly the nominal exchange rate is reported for Haiti because of a lack of inflation data.
bAverage excludes India.  Another admittedly indirect indicator that countries are suffering as a 
result of rising prices is the change in cereal imports in 2007 and 2008. USDA 
data suggest that most developing regions experienced declines of 10–20 per-
cent in 2007 or 2008 (Appendix Figure A.1). The main exceptions are wheat 
imports in the MENA region, as discussed above.
Food Price Trends in Developing Countries (Transmission)
The transmission of rising international prices into domestic markets is quite 
complex. Analytically speaking, “transmission” refers to several steps. The 
first step is the conversion of dollar-denominated international prices into 
local currency prices, as discussed above. The second refers to domestic 
policies that alter the local price of foods through tariffs, subsidies, export 
bans, reserve systems, price controls, and so on. However, the effects of 
these factors are generally bundled together as a residual. This residual also 
reflects a range of other factors, including substitutability between imported 
and domestic foods; supply and demand responses to price changes; and, 
more problematically, domestic factors that may have nothing to do with 
rising international food prices, such as exogenous supply shocks related to 
weather, the rising cost of oil, or nonfood inflationary factors (for example, 
monetary policies). Thus it may be possible that the change in domestic 
prices is very high, even though, strictly speaking, there is little transmission 
of international prices.
  Bearing these important caveats in mind, how strongly might international 
prices be transmitted to domestic markets? Both commodity-specific prices 
and consumer price indexes can be used to assess this issue. Each approach 
has different strengths. Commodity-specific approaches are useful for assess-
ing transmission proper, including the impacts of exchange rate movements. 
In principle, the food consumer price index (CPI) is more comprehensive and 
should be a better indicator of welfare costs, especially when it is deflated 
by the nonfood CPI to look at the terms of trade for food, or real food-price 
trends. A potential weakness of this type of measure is that if oil prices or 
domestic policies are also driving up nonfood inflation, then the terms of 
trade for food may change very little, but domestic consumers might still suf-
fer, because even general inflation appears to have a strong adverse effect 
on poverty (Easterly and Fischer 2001). Another potential weakness is that
the CPI may not reflect the consumption bundle of the poor, or of certain 
groups of the poor.1 An additional problem for the present analysis is that CPI 
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1 Conversely, in some countries (for example, Mali) governments use the price of one commodity 
(such as rice) as a proxy for a broader food basket.data have not been updated to a large set of countries and mostly pertain to 
2007. Hence we do not report it here (see Headey and Fan 2008).
  Nevertheless, to demonstrate the importance of the distinction between 
nominal and real prices, and between food CPI trends and individual com-
modity trends, we look at the very instructive case of Nigeria. In that country 
the nominal food CPI increased by 50 percent from January 2005 to the end 
of 2008. However, inflation in the rest of the economy (the nonfood CPI) 
was sufficiently high to minimize real price changes. Indeed, the real food-
price index was lower in 2008 than it was in mid-2005. When we compare 
this index to the average of four staples, also in real prices, we see only a 
broadly similar story with one critical difference. The broad similarity is that 
real prices for the four-staple average in 2008 were indeed lower than they 
were in 2005. The critical difference is that staple prices doubled between 
September 2007 and late 2008, which the food CPI barely registered. The 
Nigerian example is pertinent because it shows that price changes may be 
rapid, but not large relative to historical norms or to inflation in the broader 
economy.
  Figure 3.3 demonstrates three things: (1) it is vital to look at real prices; 
(2) it may be important to focus on the key staples that make up a large por-
tion of a poor person’s consumption rather considering the broader CPI; and 
(3) it may be important to look at food price changes in 2008 because of the 
speed of price changes. An assessment of individual commodity trends across 
countries was initially quite difficult in the current crisis because of the pau-
city of data on both wholesale and retail prices in developing countries (Headey
and Fan 2008). However, the crisis prompted a significant scaling up of local
food-price collection and dissemination by such bodies as USAID/Famine
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), the WFP, and the GIEWS, among 
others. For the commodity-level analysis below we use the new GIEWS (2009) 
dataset, which reports real food price trends for more than 50 countries and a 
wide range of commodities. Although impressive in scope, the GIEWS dataset is 
unbalanced in that different commodities are reported across countries, some-
times in wholesale prices and sometimes retail, and variously as processed (for 
example, bread) or semi-processed (for example, flour).
  So Table 3.3 reports some broad price trends by commodity, whereas 
Table 3.4 explores the heterogeneity in price movements by making use of 
cross-country and cross-commodity regressions. The descriptive statistics 
in Table 3.3 relate to the average real price change for each commodity 
between a given month in 2008 and the corresponding month in 2007, thereby 
taking account of seasonality. The statistics show that the real monthly 
prices of commodities were significantly higher in 2008 than they were in the 
corresponding months of 2007. Prices were highest for potatoes (only five 
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only nine observations), maize and rice (about 25 percent), and millet (20 
percent, but only nine observations). Wheat prices rose by about 10 percent, 
perhaps because wheat prices rose earlier than those of some other com-
modities. An important feature of Table 3.3 is that in all cases there was wide 
variation in price changes.
  Table 3.4 explores this variation with a cross-country regression. The 
dependent variable is the change in the price of any given month over the 
corresponding month in 2007, so we again control for seasonality effects. 
Moreover, we can look at when prices were highest in 2008 relative to 2007. 
Unsurprisingly, price peaks occurred when international prices were signifi-
cantly higher, albeit with some lag. Specifically, the seasonal price difference
was highest in May, June, and July 2008. Prices continued to be significantly 
higher in August and September.






























Figure 3.3  Comparing real and nominal CPI trends to real staples prices 
in Nigeria
Sources:   CPI data are from the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics. Staple prices are from GIEWS 
(2009).
Notes:   Staple prices include those for cowpeas, maize, millet, and sorghum, which were 
used to calculate an average price index with each commodity weighted by the 
staple’s share in dietary energy. CPI, Consumer Price Index; TOT, terms of trade.Table 3.3  Descriptive statistics for average monthly price changes by 
major commodity, 2008
     Standard
   Mean  deviation  Minimum  Maximum
 Number  of  (percent  (percent  (percent  (percent
Commodity observations  change)  change)  change)  change)
Beans 21  9.4  15.6  –29.2 36.8
Bread 11  9.8  10.4  –10.0 22.3
Maize 42  35.9  81.8  –26.9 500.0
Cassava 6  1.7  8.0  –13.1 10.0
Millet 9  19.7  21.3  –6.3 68.5
Potatoes 5  51.2  68.8 2.2  159.1
Rice 44  24.3  23.6  –8.8 89.4
Sorghum  9  27.0 17.4  3.5 62.7
Wheat 14  7.8  18.8  –20.2 52.9
Wheat (flour)  12  12.2  17.7  –9.4 52.9
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from GIEWS (2009).
Table 3.4  Patterns of price changes across time, commodities, 
and regions
Dependent variable  Annual change in prices by corresponding month (percent)
Number of countries  48
Number of observations  1,967
R-squared 0.08
Variable Coefficient  Variable Coefficient
Monthly dummies (January = base)    Regional dummies (South America = base)
February 5.4  Central  America  17.5*
March  10.4  Middle East and North Africa  20.6
April 16.1*  Sub-Saharan  Africa  20.2*
May 20.2*  East  Asia  1.6
June 21.8*  South  Asia  15.1*
July  20.4*  Landlocked versus coastal  33.5*
August 17.1*
September  16.2*  Commodity dummies (all others = base)
October 8.6  Wheat 20.7*
November 4.4  Maize  33.6*
December 2.6  Rice  19.6*
Constant  –15.2  Rice (high quality)  15.9
   Potatoes  31.0*
Product characteristic dummies   Cassava  –14.7**
Retail versus wholesale  –4.1 Millet  8.9
Semi-processed  –9.5** Beans  7.4
Processed  –6.4 Bananas  –22.9
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from GIEWS (2009).
Notes:   Prices are in real local currency units, except in a few cases (see Appendix Table A.3). 
Monthly prices in 2008 are compared to 2007 to address seasonality issues. Coeffi-
cients are significant at the 1 percent (*) and 10 percent (**) levels, respectively.  We now look at the characteristics of each commodity. We would expect 
retail price changes to be lower than wholesale price changes, which is what 
we find on average, although the effect is not significant. Only marginally 
lower price changes occurred for processed and semi-processed goods. Each 
of these dummies predicts price changes that are 5–10 percentage points 
lower than the base (wholesale or unprocessed).
  Turning next to regional effects, we find that relative to the base conti-
nent, South America, price changes were low in East Asia but high in Central 
America, South Asia (except India) and Sub-Saharan Africa. The large price rise
in Africa is somewhat surprising, as is the 33.5 percentage points extra rise in 
prices in landlocked countries relative to coastal countries. With the excep-
tion of Afghanistan, all landlocked countries in our sample are in Africa, 
so we also ran a regression excluding the landlocked dummy variable. This 
regression shows that the average difference between price changes in Africa 
and South America is 33 percent. Thus there is something of an African price 
puzzle, which future research would do well to explore further.
  Finally, we look at individual commodities. Unlike that in Table 3.3, 
the regression model used in Table 3.4 nets out the effects of retail versus 
wholesale, processed versus unprocessed, and regional effects. Relative to a 
base consisting of such goods as barley, lentils, meats and seafoods, sorghum, 
teff, and other less common food types, price changes were highest in maize, 
potatoes, rice, and wheat; lower in beans and millet; and much lower in 
bananas and cassava. Price increases that are highest in those commodities 
characterizing the global food crisis again suggest high rates of transmission. 
However, future work could use other variables to explain cross-country pat-
terns in price changes, such as monetary policies or trade and exchange rate 
policies.
  Finally, we look at food-price impacts at the country level using GIEWS 
(2009). This is challenging, given the incomplete and unbalanced coverage of 
the data, but essentially we try to construct a food price index using several 
steps designed to make the data more comparable. First, a cross-country and
cross-commodity regression (similar to the one used in Table 3.4) was used to 
determine price change differences between wholesale and retail commodi-
ties and between unprocessed, semi-processed, and fully processed products. 
Wholesale, semi-processed, and fully processed items were then adjusted to 
give an unprocessed retail price equivalent. Next we again netted out sea-
sonality effects by taking the average of differences between prices in each 
month of 2008 over corresponding months of 2007. Finally, we aggregated 
multiple commodities into a single price index using dietary energy shares as
weights. Note, however, that in a few cases total energy shares of all com-
modities for a country were quite low (in some cases a little less than 30 per-
66  CHAPTER 3cent; this result may be because of diverse diets, such as in Uganda [Benson 
2008]), whereas in other cases only one food item was reported, but this item 
constituted 50–60 percent of dietary energy (for example, rice in Asia). Also, 
some countries did not report data for all of 2008, although we ensured that 
at least nine months of data were available, or we used the rise in prices 
over the first half of 2008 to proxy to garner an estimate. Countries with 
these caveats attached to them are listed in the notes to Figure 3.4. The 
figure groups countries by their level of real price change.
  Figure 3.4 demonstrates some basic spatial patterns. Most Asian countries 
for which we have data witnessed moderate price changes, although Vietnam 
and Thailand—two large rice exporters—witnessed big price changes in rice. 
India and Bangladesh actually witnessed lower prices in 2008, partly because 
prices in 2007 were quite high. Price changes were significant in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and very high in Sri Lanka. In Latin America, price changes were 
modest and sometimes even negative in South America, but several Central 
American countries experienced large changes in food prices, consistent with 
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Very large change (30%)
Figure 3.4  Some cautious estimates of price changes in staple foods 
during 2008
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from GIEWS (2009).
Notes:   Prices are in real local currency units, except in a few cases (see Appendix Table 
A.3). The price series is an estimate of retail prices for unprocessed staple foods. 
Countries with limited data include Cameroon, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Honduras, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia. In these cases, 
either monthly data for 2008 were incomplete or the commodities in question made 
up less than 30 percent of dietary energy share.our above analysis, which emphasized the lack of any counteracting effect 
from favorable exchange rate movements with the U.S. dollar.
  In Africa the story is complex. A few countries witnessed declining real 
prices, such as Cameroon, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zambia (whose 
strong currency might have affected the cost of imports). However, many 
countries experienced steep price changes in 2008, including some of the 
most populous countries, such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nige-
ria, Senegal, and Sudan. In some cases, domestic factors were undoubtedly 
important (for example, monetary factors in Ethiopia or conflict in Kenya and 
Sudan). In some instances these factors spilled over into tighter food markets 
in neighboring countries, such as Uganda.
  The results in Figure 3.4 should be treated with caution, but they do 
seem to be broadly consistent with other evidence.2 In a study of seven Asian 
economies, Dawe (2008) found that transmission rates of rice and wheat 
prices were generally low in Asia. In India, Philippines, and Vietnam the pass-
through was just 6–11 percent, but in the remaining countries it was 41–65 
percent. However, as our data suggest, several South Asian countries seem 
to have been more affected than were East Asian countries and India. Dawe 
(2008) finds that Bangladeshi international wheat prices were fully transmit-
ted into Bangladesh (albeit mostly in 2007). Ul Haq, Nazli, and Meilke (2008) 
find that Pakistan’s food CPI increased by 14.4 percent from 2006/07 to 
2007/08, which is more than twice that of the nonfood CPI.
  For Latin America there is not much data updated beyond early or mid-
2008. The International Development Bank (see Cuesta and Jaramillo 2009) 
reports food price inflation for Latin America countries from January 2006 to 
March 2008. These data suggest large nominal increases (greater than 25 per-
cent) in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For 
Mexico during a similar period, Valero-Gil and Valero (2008) find larger nomi-
nal food-price changes than would be suggested by Mexico’s food price index 
(which rose by 13 percent of 2006 to March 2008): most food prices increased 
by about 15–30 percent, such as those for beans (26 percent), chicken (32 
percent), and tortillas (20 percent), but larger increases were observed for 
eggs (63 percent) and vegetables (80 percent), and much lower increases (less
than 10 percent) for beef, milk, sugar, and tomatoes.
  For Africa, other evidence is mixed. Data for Uganda (Benson et al. 2008),
Ghana (Cudjoe et al. 2008), and Mozambique (Arndt et al. 2008) are quite 
consistent in finding moderate, large, and very large changes, respectively. 
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2 Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz (2009) provide an overview of price increases across developing 
regions based on the same GIEWS data.But FEWSNET data report price changes that appear to be lower than those 
reported in Appendix Table A.3, although the raw data were not made avail-
able for cross-checking.3 However, Abbott (2009) reviews evidence from 
FAO and WFP researchers that identifies similarly large increases in prices, 
despite the initial delay in transmission. This delay is not surprising. Our ear-
lier appraisals of World Bank (2008a) food and nonfood CPI data for 2007 and 
early 2008 showed a low degree of food inflation in most African countries 
(see Headey and Fan 2008). But it would appear that at that stage interna-
tional prices had not yet peaked and had not worked their way into African 
markets. Moreover, the spread of the financial crisis outside of the United 
States to Europe led to a strengthening U.S. dollar, so that although interna-
tional prices were declining in U.S. dollars, they were declining much less in 
euros. Indeed, in our earlier appraisal we had cautioned against putting too 
much weight on data from early 2008 for this very reason: exchange rates can 
reverse quickly. Evidence cited in Abbott (2009), for example, confirms that 
West African cereal prices, especially in the euro-pegged West African franc 
zone, remained relatively high in the second half of 2008 and in early 2009.
  In light of the updated facts, we put forth several factors that could 
explain why African countries appear to have experienced surprisingly rapid 
inflation:
1.   Greater dependence on cereal imports in large parts of Africa (Ng and 
Aksoy 2008)
2.   Relative to Asia, much weaker policy mechanisms for stabilizing food prices 
(Dawe 2008)
3.   Increasing transport costs stemming from the rise in fuel prices
4.   An increased prevalence of climatic shocks (as in Niger or Uganda), politi-
cal instability (as in Kenya, Somalia, or Sudan), strong regional spillovers 
into neighboring markets (such as Kenya’s impact on Uganda; Benson et 
al. 2008), and relatively loose monetary or fiscal policies (as in Ethiopia 
or Malawi)4
5.   High rates of substitution between international cereals and domestic staples 
(such as for beans, cassava, millet, and sorghum)
On this final point, however, we can offer relatively little evidence. In addi-
tion, historical evidence on elasticities of substitution may provide limited 
guidance because of rapid urbanization and because demand elasticities dur-
ing crises may differ from those that prevail in normal times.
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3 FEWSNET data are available at <http://www.fews.net/Pages/markettrade.aspx>.
4 These factors contribute to price rises independently of international transmission but could 
also reinforce transmission.  Future research would do well to explore this question further, especially 
what appears to be the somewhat puzzling rise in food prices in Africa, even 
in several landlocked countries typically thought to be shielded from interna-
tional price movements.
Microeconomic Simulations of the Effects of Rising 
Food Prices on Poverty
This section reviews three papers that provide cross-country simulations of 
the impacts of rising prices on household poverty: Ivanic and Martin’s (2008)
study of 9 countries across several continents; the study by Wodon et al. 
(2008) of 12 West African countries; and the study by Dessus, Herrera, and 
Hoyos (2008) of the urban sector of 73 developing countries.5 These papers 
have been selected because they cover a range of countries and use quite 
similar methodologies despite their different sample sizes and scopes.
  The basic approach in these papers follows Deaton (1989) in estimating 
the change in food welfare (ΔWFood) as the product of the food net-benefit 
ratio (NBRFood) and the change in food prices (ΔPFood):
  ΔWFood = ΔPFood × NBRFood = ΔPFood × (YFood/YTotal – CFood/CTotal),
where YFood/YTotal is the ratio of food sales and own-production to total house-
hold monetary income, and CFood/CTotal is the ratio of food expenditure and 
own-consumption to total household expenditure. Notice that, by definition, 
own-production equals own-consumption, and because each enters into YFood/
YTotal and CFood/CTotal, respectively, the consumption of food produced by the 
household is netted out of NBRFood. Hence the main issues with microeconomic 
assessments of the poverty impacts concern the size of price changes, the 
numbers of net buyers and sellers, and the choice of poverty line. The most 
important point to note about these papers is that none of them assesses the 
most likely impact on poverty for the following reasons:
1.   Data sources. All three studies simulate results from admittedly quite 
recent macroeconomic surveys, although this problem is not serious, as 
the key parameters derived from these surveys will not have changed sig-
nificantly in recent years.
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5 See also the study by Zezza et al. (2008) of the welfare impacts of 13 LDCs. That study is 
omitted from the present discussion because it does not calculate the effects of rising prices on 
poverty headcounts. ADB (2008) also makes estimates, but for only two countries. The Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Inter-American Development Bank are also reported to 
have made estimates, but these were not publicly available, and they appeared to have used 
different and rather simplistic methods (see Lustig 2008).2.   Price changes. All three studies assume domestic food price changes for 
lack of actual data. Thus the results of these studies should be treated 
as experimental answers to the research question “What would happen 
to poverty rates if prices increased by x percent?” In one simulation by 
Ivanic and Martin (2008), the authors do use real international prices, but 
they assume a common 60 percent transmission rate to domestic prices. 
In general, however, the three studies simulate real price changes rang-
ing from 10 to 30 percent. Whether these guesses are too high or too low 
is still not clear. So far we have very limited data on how much overall 
food prices are changing. Also, what data we do have tend to be urban 
prices (often wholesale prices). Food prices in rural areas will often be 
very different, and price rises will probably be smaller in rural areas 
because of higher transaction costs. Recent studies show that African 
markets in the same country may not be equally well integrated with 
international markets (Cudjoe, Breisinger, and Diao 2008; Ulimwengu, 
Workne, and Paulos 2009), which has strong implications for the spatial 
impacts of the crisis.
3.   Behavioral responses. The three studies assume a limited range of be-
havioral responses by consumers and producers. All acknowledge this, 
and Martin and Ivanic’s (2008) study provides a slightly more sophisti-
cated model that also incorporates wage effects based on the Stolper–
Samuelson matrix relating net factor incomes to changes in the domes-
tic prices of trade goods. But there could be other responses, even in 
the short term. Many households have diversified income sources that 
are also flexible, and in Africa most rural people have access to land. 
When food prices are low, households may chiefly allocate their labor 
to the nonfarm sector and only farm their own land to supplement their 
disposable income. Rising food prices, however, could result in fairly 
quick and reasonably sizable shifts back into on-farm production (much 
of which would not show up in national production data). Likewise, 
many countries have diversified diets and may be able to switch to 
locally produced alternatives. This behavior would, of course, induce 
prices rises in locally produced goods, but overall food inflation may be 
contained.
4.   Net buyers and net sellers. Many of the countries in the study samples of 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) and Wodon et al. (2008) experience significant 
increases in poverty. Similar methods applied to individual country studies 
find equally strong results, including poverty increases in Ghana (Cudjoe,
Breisinger, and Diao 2008), Mexico (Valero-Gil and Valero 2008), and Paki-
stan (ul Haq, Nazli, and Meilke 2008). Even a net rice exporter like Thai-
land appears to experience an increase in national poverty because of 
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times larger than those in urban poverty, especially in Africa. In Zambia, 
for example, Ivanic and Martin (2008) estimate that the incidence of rural 
poverty increases three times as much as urban poverty, which is surprising. 
Is it possible that these surveys overestimate net food consumers? Aksoy and 
Isik-Dikmelik (2008) also analyze household surveys (including some of the 
surveys analyzed by Ivanic and Martin [2008]) and conclude that (i) although 
most poor households are net food buyers, almost 50 percent are marginal 
net buyers and (ii) net buyers typically have higher average incomes than 
net food sellers in eight of the nine countries surveyed, so that a rise in 
food prices would generally have progressive effects on income distribu-
tion. Another explanation for the high impacts on rural poverty found in 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) may be related to measurement error. Household 
surveys may generally underestimate the degree to which rural households 
are net sellers of food, because the consumption side of household accounts 
is generally better measured than the production side (Cudjoe, Breisinger, 
and Diao 2008).6 For similar reasons, household income in rural regions may 
not be as well measured as it is in urban regions. Hence, the Ivanic and 
Martin (2008) and Wodon et al. (2008) studies may overestimate the impact 
of price rises on rural poverty.
5.   Excluding oil prices. None of these papers considers rising oil prices (or fer-
tilizer prices) as a simultaneous shock to income and revenue streams. This 
omission is significant, because oil prices have increased more than food 
prices, oil prices have larger and more pervasive impacts on exports, and oil 
prices affect prices of a number of other goods. The study of Mozambique
by Arndt et al. (2008), for example, finds that rising fuel prices induce much
larger increases in poverty than do rising food prices. Passa Orio and Wodon 
(2008) estimate the longer term impact of specific commodity price spikes 
on the price of other commodities by using a social accounting matrix 
multiplier. They find that indirect effects are significantly larger for oil 
than they are for food in three of eight countries sampled.
6.   Excluding broader economic growth. None of these studies factor in strong 
economic growth, which characterizes several developing countries that 
have been benefiting from strong commodity prices.
7.   Poverty lines. Finally, there is the choice of poverty lines; specifically, 
whether to use a national or an international measure (for example, US$1 
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6 We thank Xinshen Diao for this astute comment. The specific argument is that microsurveys 
are more regularly updated on the consumption side; production—being largely seasonal—is 
only measured at distant intervals. It is sometimes argued that household income is also under-
estimated in these surveys.a day). The international measure is quite imperfect, although the Inter-
national Comparison Program will soon be releasing internationally com-
parable poverty-specific cost-of-living indexes. In the absence of better 
measures, all these studies use international poverty lines, but this choice 
can potentially make a considerable difference to the results.7
  In addition to these general limitations, the individual studies have some 
specific limitations (Table 3.5). Wodon et al. (2008) consider different food 
items for different countries, which generally constitute dissimilar shares of 
total consumption, casting some doubt on whether their results are highly 
comparable. Dessus, Herrera, and Hoyos (2008) only examine the effects of
aggregate food consumption on urban poverty, assuming constant shares 
of food expenditures and fixed food/nonfood elasticities across countries. 
Moreover, their estimates often contradict findings from the other two stud-
ies (Appendix Table A.4), suggesting measurement error may be a problem 
in their results. Appendix Table A.4 compares urban poverty estimates in the 
handful of countries analyzed in at least two of the three studies. The com-
parisons indicate that in at least five of the countries listed the results differ 
greatly across two of the three studies. In Cambodia, Nigeria, and Ghana,
the Dessus, Herrera, and Hoyos (2008) estimates of urban poverty changes 
are several percentage points higher than those of Ivanic and Martin (2008) 
and Wodon et al. (2008) for total poverty changes. For Senegal and Guinea, 
the Dessus, Herrera, and Hoyos estimates are considerably smaller than those 
from Wodon et al. In most other cases the differences are negligible.
  On this basis—and with significant doubts about the magnitude of price 
transmission within countries—we conclude that these cross-country micro-
economic studies point to the possibility of marked increases in hunger, but 
they do not provide reliable indications of the actual effects of rising food 
prices on poor and vulnerable people.
Global Estimates of the Impacts of Rising Food Prices 
on Poverty and Malnutrition
When a global crisis emerges there is an understandable demand for global 
estimates of just how serious the crisis is. From the average impacts of their 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS  73   
7 Ivanic and Martin (2008) provide some robustness tests, indicating that the sign of their effects 
are indeed quite robust. ADB (2008) gauges poverty effects in Pakistan and Philippines using 
national poverty lines, but in Pakistan’s case this line is much higher than the US$1 per day line, 
hence the Asian Development Bank’s estimates of the impact on poverty are many times larger 
than those estimated by Ivanic and Martin (2008). Ivanic and Martin also find that the results for 
Pakistan are sensitive to changes in the price shock being simulated, with rural poverty declin-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.nine-country study, Ivanic and Martin (2008) estimate that 105 million people 
could be thrown into dollar-a-day poverty. Clearly this estimate is extremely 
tenuous, given the diversity of country circumstances (for example, net buyers/
net sellers and degrees of transmission) and that many of the largest poor 
countries (China, India, and Indonesia) were scarcely affected at all.
  In its 2008 state of food insecurity publication, FAO (2008) estimates 
that the number of chronically hungry people in 2007 increased by 75 mil-
lion over its estimate of 848 million undernourished in 2003–05, with much 
of the increase attributed to high food prices. These estimates are also very 
provisional but are at least more comprehensive. The estimation technique 
is as follows. First, trends in dietary energy supply are derived from detailed 
“supply utilization accounts” and more recent data covering cereals, oils, and 
meats available for human consumption (accounting for about 80 percent of 
dietary energy supply). Next, the more recent data were used to extrapolate 
the core database to 2007. Finally, the 2007 estimates were used to capture 
the impact of food prices on hunger at the global and regional levels only. 
These estimates suggest that Asia accounts for 41 million of the extra 75 mil-
lion undernourished, Africa for 24 million, and Latin America and the MENA 
region for the remaining 10 million. FAO (2008) argues that its figures may 
underestimate the increase in hunger because it is assumed that the distribu-
tion of dietary energy intake stays the same when prices rise, whereas micro-
economic work suggests otherwise (Zezza et al. 2008). Rosen and Shapouri   
(2008) of the USDA estimate an increase of 133 million extra malnourished 
people in some 70 countries. Their estimate is significantly higher, because 
they choose a required caloric intake of 2,200 calories that is not adjusted 
for age and gender, factors which can reduce the required intake to as low as 
1,600 calories. Despite the usual caveats, estimates of malnutrition incidence 
have the benefit of not having to rely on assumptions about price transmis-
sion. The downside is that not all of the increase in malnutrition can be 
attributed to rising food prices, although rising prices are justifiably a prime 
suspect.
Distribution of Poverty Impacts across Socioeconomic 
Groups and Individuals
The diversity of microeconomic vulnerability across socioeconomic groups 
within countries is also a major issue. Clearly there are a range of factors 
that influence the vulnerability of households to rising food prices within and 
across countries. Zezza et al. (2008) go further than the three simulation 
studies examined at the start of this section by disaggregating vulnerability 
across groups and explaining vulnerability measures with ordinary least squares 
regressions. Across 13 developing countries from different parts of the devel-
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nonfarm, larger, less educated, more dependent on female labor, less well 
served by infrastructure, and in the rural sector, those with limited access 
to land and modern agricultural inputs. All these findings are fairly intui-
tive, but it is still useful to see microeconomic evidence confirming these 
intuitions and offering orders of magnitude as to which household attributes 
matter most.
  An omission from all these studies is the intrahousehold allocation of food. 
Anecdotal evidence during the crisis pointed to the greatest consumption 
losses falling on women and girls (for example, Sullivan 2008). Food allocation 
is widely studied, and yet an earlier review of the intrahousehold literature 
by Haddad et al. (1996) found that, outside of northern India and Bangla-
desh, evidence of pro-male biases in food consumption is scarce. Of course, 
in times of scarcity or in food insecure regions (for example, the Sahel), 
this behavior may change. It has been noted that women often act as shock 
absorbers of household food security by reducing their own consumption to 
leave more food for other household members, notably children (Dercon and 
Krishnan 2000; Quisumbing, Meinzen-Dick, and Bassett 2008). FAO (2008) 
summarizes a range of recent historical evidence in support of this observa-
tion, including drought-induced stunting in Zambia in 2001 and increased 
maternal undernutrition and anemia in Indonesia following the 1997 financial 
crisis. So far, however, we have not seen any recent studies of this issue in 
the context of the world food crisis, but it is sure to be a fruitful research 
area in the future.
Impacts on Producers: Supply Response and Welfare Implications
Early in the crisis it was widely assumed that prices would remain high because 
of production constraints, and that higher prices would hurt the rural poor for 
the same reason. With the benefit of new estimates of production in 2008/09, 
it is now possible to at least assess supply response at the national, regional, 
and global levels.
  Excluding such outliers as Argentina (troubled by a series of poor policy 
decisions and farmer protests), Australia (still troubled by drought), and Kenya 
(troubled by conflict), most major cereal producers—including both major 
consumer nations and major exporter nations—responded very positively. 
Table 3.6 reports USDA (2009) production data on the percentage change 
between 2007/08 and 2008/09. The table separates producers into those 
primarily producing for domestic consumption (especially consumer countries 
with large populations) and those in which a significant portion of production 
(more than 10 percent) is for export. The major consuming nations increased 
76  CHAPTER 3production during this period by 16.8 percent for maize, 12.4 percent for 
rice, and 8.5 percent for wheat. Particularly strong was the supply response 
in China and India, both of which increased their public agricultural spending 
by about 20–30 percent in 2008. As might be expected, the response from 
major exporting nations was even stronger, especially for maize and wheat 
production, which increased by 25–30 percent. Production increases in rice 
were more limited, which is consistent with the hypothesis that smallholders 
(who dominate rice production) have less scope to respond.
  However, other factors could account for the sometimes sluggish response 
of rice. First, the increase in rice prices arrived late in the crisis and the 
bubble burst quickly. Rice producers may have rationally identified the rice 
spike as a short-term bubble that would soon collapse. Second, as discussed 
above, export restrictions were highly prevalent in rice-producing countries, 
and most Asian countries insulate domestic markets from international price 
movements. Thus in most rice-producing countries the incentives to increase 
production were limited by government policies and not necessarily by lack 
of responsiveness from smallholders. Third, Asian rice producers are much 
more dependent on fertilizers than smallholders from other regions. In coun-
tries where fertilizers are highly subsidized and/or their export is restricted 
so that fertilizer prices do not rise much (such as in China and India), supply 
response in rice production was quite high (about 10 percent for both coun-
tries) despite the modest increase in the price of rice. In other countries with 
fertilizer subsidies, supply response was also significant. In Malawi, maize 
production increased by 50 percent. In Nigeria maize and rice production 
increased by 17.9 percent and 30.7 percent, respectively. Ethiopia, where 
food inflation has been high for several years, is also estimated to have expe-
rienced rapid growth in maize production in 2008/09 (52.7 percent).
  Of course, with rising fertilizer prices on international markets, domestic 
subsidies have become very expensive. Gulati and Dutta (2009) report that 
India’s fertilizer subsidies have almost doubled from 2000–01 to 2006–07 and will
most likely double again in 2008–09. In Malawi direct program costs to govern-
ment and donors were just less than US$91 million before the food crisis, total 
government expenditure was 25 percent over budget, and subsidies comprised
40 percent of the Ministry of Agriculture budget and more than 5 percent of the
national budget (Dorward et al. 2009). With the rise in fertilizer prices, fer-
tilizer subsidies constitute a significant threat to the fiscal balances of the 
government. In Nigeria fertilizer subsidies made up 50–70 percent of federal 
government expenditure during 2000–05, so rising costs were once again a sig-
nificant drain on the public coffers (Mogues et al. 2008), although Nigeria is of 
course much better off fiscally because of the oil boom.
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  Despite positive signs at the national, regional, and global levels, it is still 
difficult to say that small farmers in developing countries are significantly 
better off than they were before the crisis. In addition to rising input costs, 
transport costs have increased because of rising fuel prices, and these too 
may eat into farmers’ profits. Moreover, there is so far no systematic data on 
farmgate prices, so it is unclear to what extent higher retail prices in devel-
oping countries are being translated into higher farmgate prices. We strongly 
suggest that this issue is both an important policy question and a longer term 
research question.CHAPTER 4
Learning from the Past: 
Comparisons to the 1972–74 Food Crisis
T
he recent surge in food prices has been commonly termed a crisis, and
not without justification. But such a crisis is not new. The world experi-
enced a remarkably similar event in the early to mid-1970s. In this chapter
we ask whether there are common causes of these crises. In the next chapter we
ask whether these events point to systemic problems in the global food system.
Food Crises Past and Present
As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1972–74 crisis was of a similar scale and scope 
to the current food crisis (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). In constant dollar 
terms, wheat and soybean price increases have been slightly smaller in the 
current crisis (in the case of wheat, increasing 180 percent during 1970–74 
versus 110 percent from 2005 to May 2008), but the maize price increase
has been slightly larger (80 percent in 1972–74 versus 90 percent during the
current crisis). The increase in rice prices has been roughly the same (a
little more than 225 percent in both cases). Changes in fertilizer prices have
been about the same, although percentage changes in oil prices were 
much larger in the 1970s. Finally, the sudden decline in international food 
prices from June 2008 to March 2009—contrary to the predictions of lead-
ing organizations and prominent experts—also closely follows the decline in 
food prices after mid-1974.1 By our calculations, real prices of staple grains 
dropped by a little more than 40 percent from 1974 to 1978, and from June 
2008 to March 2009 staples have dropped by 35 percent on average. Hence 
the intertemporal and intercommodity profiles of price changes across the 
two crises are remarkably similar.
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1 Gulati and Dutta (2009) nicely summarize the inflated predictions regarding food prices by 
such eminent writers as Jagdish Bhagwati, Jeffrey Sachs, and Paul Krugman, as well as high-
level officials in prominent agricultural and development institutions, such as IFPRI, the FAO, 
and the World Bank.Causes of the 1972–74 Crisis
If the profiles of the two crises are similar, is it also possible that the crises 
had common causes? To answer this question we need to revisit the 1972–74 
food crisis. Figure 4.1 depicts a timeline of events leading up to and follow-
ing this event, and the following discussion explores these factors in more 
detail.
  As with the current crisis, the causes seem to fall into three categories: 
rising oil prices, a variety of market shocks on both the supply and demand 
sides, and longer term pressures on international food commodity markets. 
Like today, many of the causes of the 1972–74 crisis relate to U.S. produc-
tion and trade conditions, especially with respect to wheat and other coarse 
grains. In the 1930s North America exported a mere 5 million tons of grain, 
and of all the other regions of the world, only Europe was a net importer 
(Figure 4.2). By 1966, however, North American grain exports had increased 
twelvefold to reach nearly 60 million tons, the Communist countries went 
from a 5 million ton surplus to a 4 million ton deficit, and Asia moved from a 2 
million ton surplus to a deficit of 34 million tons. North America had become 
the global epicenter of the grains trade, meaning that changes in North 
American trade and production had the potential to significantly impact 
international prices and global food security. This is still true today.
  In this regard, the earliest contributing factor to the crisis was probably 
U.S. policies regarding wheat production (Johnson 1975; Destler 1978). The 
market condition saw chronic surpluses and depressed prices, and the “farm 
problem” was seen to be overproduction. By the 1960s the U.S. Commodity 
Credit Corporation had already accumulated large amounts of grain stocks as 
a result of policies that supported prices well above market-clearing levels. In 
effect the United States was the world’s residual supplier of grains, through 
both cheap exports and food aid. Domestically, however, these large grain 
stocks raised political concerns over the high costs of storing the grain, which 
could not be disposed of at the prevailing support levels. Therefore, the U.S. 
government—as well as the Australian and Canadian governments, who also 
stored large stocks of wheat—took steps to drastically reduce the production 
of wheat by one-third from mid-1970 to mid-1972, reducing their global share 
of world grain production from 15 percent to about 10 percent (Johnson 1975). 
Even after this huge decrease in wheat production the three major grain 
exporters continued to further reduce their stocks (Johnson 1975).
  These policies contributed to a radically different international wheat 
market in the 1970s (Johnson 1975; Destler 1978). The existence of large 
grain reserves during the 1950s and 1960s had meant that major fluctuations 
in production only prompted minor changes in prices, because the United 
States, Canada, and Australia could use their large reserves to buffer price 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.shifts. For the crop years 1960–71 wheat prices were held within a range 
of US$59–65 per ton in 11 of the 12 years, and maize prices were similarly 
stable. But by the 1970s these reserves had been depleted, largely as a delib-
erate policy, so that even relatively mild shocks to demand and supply could 
cause extreme fluctuations in prices (Hopkins and Puchala 1978). In fact, 
a high degree of price stability was achieved during the 1960s even though 
the absolute shortfall of world grain production below trend during 1961/62–
1965/66 was greater than during 1971/72–1974/75 (72 million tons compared 
to 36 million tons). Despite this significant change in grain markets, only India 
responded to the shift by increasing its own stocks as an offset to the declines 
of North American and Australian stocks.
  During this increasingly fragile grains trade regime, several reasonably 
significant shocks ensued in the early 1970s. The most important of these, 
however, was effectively a demand rather than a supply shock.2 In June 1971 
the Nixon administration liberalized exports to the China, Eastern Europe, 
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2  Although Communist countries’ demand for U.S. wheat was itself precipitated by production 
shocks (especially in the USSR) and poor agricultural policies, the sudden entry of the Commu-
nist bloc into world grains trade amounted to a demand shock.















Eastern Europe and USSR
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Figure 4.2  Changing patterns in the grain trade, 1930s–1970s
Source:   USDA as cited in Ward (1974).and the USSR after receiving predictions of normal demands for grains for the 
rest of the world (Johnson 1975; Schuh 1983).3 The amount purchased by the 
USSR was about half of U.S. carryover stocks of July 1, 1972, and more than 
one-quarter of 1972 production. It would be shipped before the 1973 crop 
was in. The USSR also made significant wheat purchases from Canada, further 
depleting North American wheat stocks. By August 1972, the wheat export 
price jumped from US$1.68 per bushel in July to US$2.40 in early August. 
U.S. policies were slow to adjust. Stagnant wheat markets for many years 
had convinced the United States that high prices were not sustainable, so the 
government held the net export price target at about US$1.63, even though 
this target drove up U.S. prices and increased the costs of U.S. farm subsi-
dies from an estimated US$67 million up to an actual cost of US$300 million 
for 1973 (Destler 1978). Pricing policies that had worked reasonably well for 
more than a decade became simply inappropriate. Without the export sub-
sidy, market prices would have much more promptly reflected the impact of 
the enormous grain exports contracted to the Communist countries in 1972, 
and a more gradual price rise would probably have ensued, allowing for more 
timely supply responses.
  In addition to the demand shock from the Communist countries, several 
supply shocks affected global grains production (Destler 1978). Harsh winters, 
droughts, or tropical cyclones affected some major producers, including Argen-
tina, Australia, India, Peru (a major producer of animal feed), Philippines, 
and the USSR, leading to a 3 percent decline in world grain production in 
1972, and 1974 also produced poor grain harvests, especially in Canada and 
the United States. This conflagration of output shocks in a relatively short 
time certainly exacerbated some of the deeper troubles in global food mar-
kets, but it is unlikely that they were a driving factor, if only because similar 
shocks have occurred in other years (for instance in the early 1960s) with 
relatively little repercussion on international prices.
  The rapid rise in rice prices is more puzzling, however, as most of the 
aforementioned shocks related to wheat production in more developed coun-
tries (even the 1974 weather shocks in India mostly affected wheat produc-
tion). The volatility in rice export prices came about precisely because of 
the thinness of the international rice trade and the special characteristics of 
the rice market (Timmer 2009; Chapter 2). But as in the current crisis (Dawe 
2008), the percentage change in nominal retail prices for rice during 1970–74 
were generally a fraction of the international price change, with Bangladesh 
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3  On June 10, 1971, Nixon terminated the need for companies to obtain clearance from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to export wheat, flour, and other grains to China, Eastern Europe, 
and the USSR, and the requirement that 50 percent of grain sold must be carried in U.S. ships 
was suspended.again being the exception (Figure 4.3; see Chapter 3), although in the early 
1970s the food crisis in Bangladesh had significant domestic causes.
  Other factors contributing to rising cereal prices were not shocks, but 
rather long-term factors that fostered tighter international food markets. At
the time, a great deal was made of rapid population growth, but the fortu-
nate emergence of a Green Revolution in Asia just prior to the 1972–74 crisis 
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Figure 4.3  Comparing changes in rice export prices versus changes in 
retail prices, 1970–74
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data collected by the International Rice Research 
Institute.mitigated the worst impacts in Asia. Rapid population growth was a bigger 
problem in both Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa (Egypt, Algeria, and 
Morocco), where cereal imports were becoming an increasing portion of total 
food demand. However, from the 1930s to the 1970s it was estimated that 
about one-third of total growth in cereal demand was from more affluent 
diets, mostly from wealthier countries (Ward 1974). Indeed, as with the 2008 
crisis, the 1972–74 crisis was preceded by more than a decade of strong global 
economic growth. And discussed in Chapter 2, a surge in cereal exports to 
oil-exporting countries accounted for more than one-third of cereal export 
growth in 1974.
  Indeed, the OPEC oil crisis was the other critical factor in raising cereal 
prices. The deeper causes of the crisis were both political and economic. On 
August 15, 1971, the United States pulled out of the Bretton Woods Accord, 
taking the United States off the Gold Exchange Standard (whereby only the 
value of the U.S. dollar had been pegged to the price of gold and all other 
currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar), allowing the dollar to float. The 
result was a depreciation of the value of the U.S. dollar, which had two 
effects. First, such devaluations may have increased the dollar price of grain 
by as much as 15 percent (Johnson 1975). The second and more important 
effect was that the devaluation triggered a chain of events in oil markets. 
Because oil was priced in dollars, oil producers were receiving less real 
income for the same price after the devaluation. The OPEC cartel responded 
to this problem by issuing a joint communiqué stating that OPEC would forth-
with price a barrel of oil against gold. However, in the years after 1971, OPEC 
was slow to readjust prices to reflect this depreciation.4 Then on October 17, 
1973, OPEC announced, as a result of the ongoing Yom Kippur War, that they 
would no longer ship oil to nations that had supported Israel in its conflict 
with Syria and Egypt (namely, the United States, its allies in Western Europe, 
and Japan). Although the embargo did not persist for long, the resultant 
price shock was enough to push both developed and developing countries 
into an inflation contagion. The direct effects on agricultural production were 
severe, because the major food production systems in the world were by 
that time already highly energy intensive. Rising oil prices were therefore 
directly transmitted to rising food prices in the United States and other major 
producers, and these elevated prices were then transmitted to other markets 
because of North America’s vital role in the grains trade.
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4  From 1947 to 1967 the price of oil in U.S. dollars had risen by less than 2 percent per year. Until 
the oil shock, the price remained fairly stable against other currencies and commodities, but 
suddenly became extremely volatile thereafter. OPEC ministers therefore had had no reason to 
develop the institutional mechanisms required for updating prices rapidly enough to keep up 
with changing market conditions, so their real incomes lagged for several years.  For non-oil exporting developing countries, the effects were especially 
severe. Foreign reserves were increasingly eaten up by oil, food, and fertil-
izer imports, with the depreciation of the U.S. dollar providing only a limited 
buffer. Rising imports costs were also exacerbated by Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) policies. Real volumes of food 
aid—especially U.S. aid—had declined markedly, because rising grain prices 
meant that the cost of procuring a given volume of food aid had essentially 
doubled. In 1974 U.S. food aid was less than 40 percent of the average vol-
ume provided in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Grant 1975). Rising fertilizer 
prices were also exacerbated by implicit export bans in OECD countries (Ward 
1974; Grant 1975) and by large nonfarm usage of fertilizers. Even well after 
the 1975 World Food Conference—which tried to convince wealthy countries 
to divert fertilizer exports to developing countries—fertilizer sellers still dis-
criminated toward selling to American buyers, and the U.S. and other OECD 
governments did not attempt to reduce nonessential uses of food and fertil-
izers. Small farmers in developing countries that had adopted Green Revolu-
tion strategies suffered especially severely, because their strategies centered 
on the production of fertilizer-intensive wheat and rice varieties and they 
were dependent on small retail outlets at the very end of the fertilizer supply-
distribution chain. Shortages of fertilizer and oil were arguably the primary 
cause of the poor 1974 winter wheat harvest in India, which only totaled 23 
million tons in contrast to a projected yield of 30 million tons (Grant 1975).
Similarities between the 1972–74 and 2008 Crises
Table 4.1 compares the principal causes of each crisis. The three most impor-
tant factors in both cases were rising oil prices, the associated decline of the 
U.S. dollar, and large demand shocks. As noted above, the oil shock was actu-
ally larger in the early 1970s, although oil prices were increasing from a low 
base. Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner (2008) find that real rest-of-the-world prices 
changed about three-quarters as much as nominal U.S. dollar prices in 1972–
74, which is less than in the current crisis but still significant. As for demand 
shocks, which fall more in the purview of agricultural policies than of price 
movements of oil and U.S. dollars, these were from different sources in each 
crisis, but the shocks in question were of remarkably similar magnitudes. In 
1972–74 the demand shock came from the USSR, which, following its own crop 
failure that year, purchased more than one-quarter of U.S. wheat production 
in 1972. In 2005–08 the primary demand shock came from the U.S. biofuels 
industry, which also absorbed one-quarter of U.S. production in 2007, this 
time in maize. Consistent with this story is that the 1972–74 crisis was char-
acterized by large price increases in wheat rather than in maize, whereas the 
reverse was true of the 2008 crisis.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.  Other factors are also common across both crises—long-run supply con-
straints, growing demand stemming from sustained economic growth, weather 
shocks, export bans, and hoarding—but these residual factors played rela-
tively minor roles, although such factors either triggered additional problems 
(for instance, the U.S.-Soviet grain deal) or exacerbated each crisis once the 
wheels were set in motion. These similarities between the two crises suggest 
that there is scope for contemporary policymakers to learn from the suc-
cesses and failures of the 1972–74 crisis.
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Lessons for the Future: 
Does the Global Food System Need Fixing?
A
lthough adverse by definition, food crises do present opportunities 
for positive change. Not only does a higher price regime provide 
incentives for farmers to scale up production, but it can also render 
the weaknesses of existing policies transparent to a broader policymaking 
audience. Indeed, the 1972–74 food crisis produced and bolstered a number 
of new institutions to fill the perceived failures of the global food system: 
for food aid (WFP), financing (International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment), research (IFPRI and the Consultative Group on International Agricul-
tural Research), and early warning systems (GIEWS). But at the same time 
international policymakers failed to address many of the most fundamental 
deficiencies of the global food system, a fact that was acknowledged at 
the time. In 1981, for example, Valdes and Siamwalla came to the following 
conclusion:
International prices of cereals have fallen in real terms, grain stocks 
have been rebuilt, and the crisis atmosphere has abated. World food 
security has ceased to be a major concern for the press and for the 
general public. Yet, the underlying causes of food crises such as the 
one in 1972–74 have not disappeared . . . on the international scene 
only limited progress has been made to help them in these efforts. 
(1981, 1)
  The deficiency of previous efforts to improve global food security is borne 
out not only by the recurrence of a global food crisis, but also by the persis-
tence of year-to-year food insecurity in a range of developing countries, per-
sistently high rates of rural poverty, and stagnating agricultural productivity 
growth. These are all complex problems requiring different sorts of solutions. 
Some problems are international in nature (for example, trade barriers, aid 
modalities, and the reserve systems of major exporters), whereas others are 
92more national in nature (for example, agricultural policies, social protection, 
infrastructure investment, and political stability).1 However, rather than trying 
to comprehensively review the policy responses of developed and developing 
countries, or even of the UN-coordinated response to the crisis,2 this conclud-
ing chapter focuses specifically on the lessons derived from our own analyses 
of the 2008 food crisis and our reflections on the 1972–74 food crisis.
  As for what constitutes food security, the basic notion used in most of the 
literature is that food-deficit countries, regions, or households should be able 
to meet target consumption levels on a year-to-year basis (Valdes and Siam-
walla 1981). “Target levels” generally refer to normal consumption levels, 
although a more stringent definition would refer to adequate levels in a nutri-
tional sense. A second, more instrumental, aspect of this definition is that 
attaining food security involves several different dimensions:
1.   Producing enough food at the global level, at a minimum
2.   Ensuring country-level access to food imports at affordable and relatively 
stable international prices
3.   Ensuring household-level access to food purchases at affordable and rela-
tively stable domestic prices
Several points are of note regarding these characteristics. First, some defi-
nitions of food security restrict themselves to affordability. However, pre-
dictability is also important. The nature of a food crisis, after all, is not so 
much absolute prices changes but the speed of price changes and the degree 
to which they take consumers, producers, and governments by surprise. 
Second, the degree to which these various aspects of food security per-
tain to national and international food systems is somewhat fuzzy. Clearly 
global production (1) and international trade (2) are largely dimensions of 
the international food system, although access to imports also depends on 
domestic factors (such as sufficient export earnings to meet import require-
ments), whereas dependence on food imports is largely the result of low 
levels of domestic food production. Likewise, access to food within countries 
(3) is more a national-level dimension of food security, except insofar as for-
eign assistance influences these outcomes through food aid, agricultural aid,
infrastructure aid, the influence of technical assistance and conditional loans
on food and input subsidies, and so on.
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1 In this section we largely restrict our analysis to the markets, policies, and regulations that 
constitute the global food system. However, the interdependencies between international and 
national food systems require the discussion to be quite flexible in this regard.
2 These responses are ably summarized by Abbott and de Battisti (2009), among others.  Figure 5.1 breaks down the global food system into three components: 
food production, food markets and trade, and the foreign aid system as it 
relates to food policies. It is important to point out that these three compo-
nents are intimately interlinked. At a global level food production and trade 
are primarily private-sector activities, but they are heavily influenced by 
national and international policies. Foreign aid is just one component of the 
broader policy environment, but it merits being treated as a separate com-
ponent of the global food system, because food aid is a large component of 
food imports in many developing countries and donor efforts to improve food 
production in developing countries constitute an international flow of resources 
rather than a purely national policy.
  Near each component of the global food system, Figure 5.1 lists the most
significant questions facing the global food system. Figure 5.1 illustrates a long-
term perspective rather than the narrower view of those problems that directly 
relate to the world food crisis. That said, both the 2008 and 1972–74 food 
crises have revealed weaknesses in the global food system, so the remaining 
discussion focuses more narrowly on these issues.
Predicting the Next Crisis
Whether either food crisis could easily have been predicted is debatable, 
given that it took most observers by surprise, even most experts (although 
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Are affluent diets
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Figure 5.1  Does the global food system need fixing?
Source:   Constructed by the authors.LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE  95   
3 Von Braun et al. (2005) raised concerns about rising food prices because of supply constraints, 
and other experts voiced concerns about declining stocks, but for the most part nobody 
expected the sharp surge in prices that ensued.
there were concerns about declining stocks among some agricultural experts).3 
Nevertheless, the fact that the 1972–74 crisis prompted policy interest in predict-
ing and preventing future crises suggests that the failure to give early warning 
signals for the current crisis is rooted in methodological or institutional failings, 
or both. Essentially our conclusion is that food security organizations and agri-
cultural researchers were caught between two extremes: tracking recent price 
developments on the one hand and predicting long-term swings on the other.
  GIEWS, for example, was set up in response to the lack of any forewarning 
to the 1972–74 crisis, so it might have been expected to have offered some 
early warning of the current crisis. However, Headey and Raszap Skorbiansky 
(2008) review GIEWS’s Food Outlook—a quarterly publication that deals with 
global food security issues—during 2005–07, yet find no evidence that GIEWS 
gave any early warning of an impending food crisis. This is partly because 
GIEWS has a strong mandate to focus on year-to-year food crises in individual 
countries and partly because publications like Food Outlook are not monitor-
ing all necessary variables, such as oil prices, cereal futures prices, and U.S. 
dollar movements (the good news on this front is that such organizations as 
GIEWS, WFP, and FEWSNET have scaled up their efforts to collect and dis-
seminate data on food prices). Interestingly, FAO (2008, 21) seems aware of 
this deficiency, and GIEWS has beefed up its monitoring of domestic food 
prices in the wake of the crisis. The other extreme is represented by sophisti-
cated modeling exercises carried out by other sections of the FAO, IFPRI, and 
various other research institutions (see the review by McCalla and Revoredo 
2001). What is needed is an intermediate approach that combines some of the 
rigor of a formal model with shorter term predictors of international prices, 
such as oil prices, exchange rates, futures market indexes, harvest informa-
tion, and demand shocks (imports or biofuels).
Improving the Functioning of Markets and Trade
The international price increases can partly be explained by factors outside 
the food system (such as oil prices and U.S. dollar movements), but it is also 
likely that several key features of the global food system made the impacts 
of these exogenous factors all the more severe. First, the world currently 
relies on the grain reserves of just a few exporting countries to stabilize 
prices and ensure stable food supply. However, this arrangement has been 
informal since the failure of negotiations on food reserves after the 1972–74 crisis, and it has largely broken down due to rising prices and new just-in-time 
inventory methods. Nevertheless it is not clear that pushing for more formal 
reserve arrangements among major producers is the right way to proceed. 
Reserves are costly—especially in mostly humid developing countries—and 
generally incompatible with the incentives of private agricultural producers 
in developed countries.
  Another option might be to use virtual reserves to smooth out futures prices 
(Robles, Torero, and von Braun 2009; von Braun and Torero 2009). Although 
innovative, more research is needed to prove causal linkages between futures 
prices and spot prices. Other policies might also help to ensure short-run access 
to international food imports. These include the World Bank’s US$1.2 billion 
rapid financing facility, the Global Food Response Program, or a proposed 
international grain reserve managed by the WFP (von Braun and Torero 2009).4 
In the wake of the 1972–74 crisis, a wave of research tried to assess all of these 
ideas, but so far such research has not been triggered by the recent crisis.
  An alternative instrument for reducing price volatility in international 
markets is to promote freer trade in agricultural commodities. This idea is 
consistent with our assessment: export restrictions played a dominant role 
in turning a critical situation into a full-blown crisis, especially in the case of 
rice. Moreover, analyses conducted after the 1972–74 crisis also demonstrated 
that free-trade regimes were a potentially viable alternative to large interna-
tional grain reserves (see Walker and Sharples 1976; Johnson 1981; Reutlinger 
and Bigman 1981),5 although more recent research has not yet revisited this 
question. Another practical issue is how to obtain a more liberal but also more 
secure international trade regime for agriculture. In the current crisis inter-
national markets failed because WTO statutes did not prevent countries from 
imposing export restrictions that induced so much unnecessary volatility. It 
has also been recognized that reforms proposed in the July 2008 Framework 
Agreement did not include provisions to discipline export taxes or bans, nor 
would special safeguard mechanisms in the agreement have approximated a 
free-trade arrangement (Abbott 2009). New arrangements need to take into 
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4 The international grain-reserve proposal in question involves a modest emergency reserve of 
about 300,000–500,000 tons of basic grains—about 5 percent of the current food aid of 6.7 million 
wheat-equivalent tons—that would be supplied by the main grain-producing countries and funded by 
a group of countries participating in the scheme (the G8+5 plus some other major grain-exporting 
countries). This decentralized reserve would be located at strategic points near or in major devel-
oping-country regions, using existing national storage facilities. A range of measures would ensure 
financial sustainability of the reserve. See von Braun and Torero (2009) for details.
5 Much of the debate on trade liberalization has focused on its growth and poverty impacts, 
although the size of these costs is disputed (see the comprehensive review by Bouët 2008). Here 
we point out that trade liberalization also has an impact on food security.account the clear preference of developing countries for domestic market 
stabilization. Another potentially important implication of our research on 
both the 1972–74 and 2008 crises is that it is the actions of major grain traders 
(exporters and importers) that has the greatest impact on international mar-
kets. As a result, binding agreements between a smaller set of large producers 
and importers may be sufficient to stabilize international markets.
Addressing Long-Term Threats to Global Food Production
The global system largely satisfies the objective of producing sufficient food 
to feed the world’s population. Moreover, as noted above, the short-term 
supply response to the most recent crisis was surprisingly strong. But despite 
these encouraging signs that the production side of the global food system 
did address the food crisis adequately, several prevailing trends threaten the 
long-term security of global food production. The challenge most relevant to 
the food crisis is clearly the diversion of crops from food or feed to biofuels. 
As noted in Chapter 2, a growing number of studies are finding that biofuels 
production has a large positive impact on food prices, but virtually no negative 
impact on energy prices. In the foreseeable future, biofuels production does 
not look good for global food security, unless ways can be found to minimize 
the diversion from food production or involve poor farmers in biofuels produc-
tion. But technologies and investments that would achieve these outcomes 
seem a long way off.
  A second major challenge to longer term food production is climate change 
and resource degradation. We found that there is no real evidence that envi-
ronmental factors were a major cause of the crisis—the only potential link 
is Australia’s unusually severe drought—but some studies find that climate 
change and resource degradation could severely impact food production in 
much of the developing world (Lobell et al. 2008; Slater et al. 2008).
  We also found no link between the food crisis and the “affluent diets” 
hypothesis. Moreover, in the past increasingly affluent diets seem to be asso-
ciated with a decline in real prices (after all, U.S. cereal prices have declined 
with only a few interruptions since the 19th century). Nevertheless, policy-
makers and researchers should not ignore the potential impacts—positive or 
negative—that increasingly affluent diets and climate change may have on 
food security in the future.
Improving Social Protection
In response to rising international prices governments and aid agencies have 
used a wide range of tools to directly or indirectly protect consumers from 
rising food prices (World Bank 2008a; Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2009). 
These include:
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•   Liberalizing imports
•   Removing sales taxes
•   Releasing stocks
•   Inducing supply response by scaling up fertilizer subsidies and other quick 
impact agricultural programs
•   Scaling up existing safety net programs
Only the last of these items is conventionally thought of as social protection, 
although in the absence of existing social protection programs and the high 
costs and long delay in setting up new ones, it is understandable that devel-
oping country governments resort to the more indirect means of protecting 
consumers. However, some of these alternative means of protecting consumers 
are less desirable than others. Export restrictions were a major cause of the 
rice price crisis, and a fairly significant cause of the rise in wheat prices.
  In light of this problem some authors have proposed that social safety net 
programs should be scaled up. The rationale here may be threefold. First, if 
social protection programs are in place, then governments need not resort to 
costly export restrictions. This argument is feasible, but the first country to 
impose significant export restrictions on rice was India, and India has many 
large social safety net programs, such as the National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme, the Food for Work Scheme, and the Public Distribution 
Scheme for food grains. None of these schemes stopped the Indian govern-
ment from imposing an export ban, and the Public Distribution Scheme perhaps 
contributed to sluggish growth in the production of wheat and rice in India.
  A second rationale for such programs is that they contribute to produc-
tive capacity by building up human capital and assets. Productive safety nets 
therefore seem to hit two targets with one instrument (Alderman and Hod-
dinott 2006). Over the long run there is good evidence that productive safety 
nets could indeed achieve some growth in productivity, but the productivity 
impacts are likely to be small relative to strictly agricultural investments. 
And as a means of responding to the current crisis they are largely irrelevant. 
Instead their main benefit is in making poor people less vulnerable to future 
crises.
  Finally, social safety nets are argued to be more poverty efficient than 
the indirect alternatives suggested above. Wodon et al. (2008) note that the 
targeting efficiency of social protection policies in Sub-Saharan Africa is much 
better than that of other economywide policies (such as tax cuts, tariff reduc-
tions, and subsidies). Bhaskar, Ahmed, and Shariff (2009) also review social 
protection programs in response to the food crisis and compare programs in 
four Asian countries.
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In contrast to those who list declining agricultural productivity of major 
cereals as a significant threat to global food production, we argue that it 
is the longer term regional imbalance in cereal production that is the most 
significant problem facing global food security. Essentially, large parts of 
the developing world, especially Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, are 
heavily dependent on cereal imports from the rest of the world, especially 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Europe, North America, and a few Asian rice 
exporters. This imbalance emerged before the 1972–74 crisis, but Africa’s 
rapid population growth combined with its weak growth in food production 
have made the imbalance starker. Of course, insufficient production growth 
may not be a problem if net cereal importers have adequate access to foreign 
exchange, but with the exception of mineral exporters, net cereal import-
ers often rely heavily on foreign aid for bolstering their exchange reserves 
or directly accessing food aid. And although this problem existed before and 
after the two world food crises, both events were exacerbated by this exces-
sive reliance on cereal imports.
  Yet addressing this issue is arguably more important than ever, especially 
in the face of longer term threats to food production (such as climate change 
and resource degradation) and changes in international trade in cereals (for 
example, the growth in biofuels). However, it is also clear that the solutions 
to this imbalance need to be country specific and that not every country in 
the world need be, or could be, totally self-sufficient in food production. 
Thus the question is essentially how to properly balance domestic food pro-
duction and reliance on imports. In many food-deficit countries the binding 
constraint is that food production is currently vastly lower than its potential 
because of a history of distortionary policies and inadequate or inappropriate 
investments in agricultural R&D, extension, and rural infrastructure (Bezemer 
and Headey 2008). In some of these countries, agriculture has traditionally 
been underemphasized in national development strategies because of ambi-
tious industrialization goals or easy access to mineral earnings.
  However, even in countries with considerable nonfarm growth potential 
(such as Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, and Nigeria), the 
equally impressive potential of agriculture means that such countries can 
play a vital role in improving food security both domestically and regionally. 
In contrast, many landlocked African countries lack nonagricultural prospects 
but also suffer from severe and worsening agroclimatic constraints (particu-
larly the Sahelian countries). Thus, unfortunately, they will never be regional 
breadbaskets. So although raising food production might still be important in 
these more agriculturally challenged and food-insecure countries, supporting 
agricultural production growth in areas of real biophysical potential is prob-
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pervasive but generally restricted to the region’s traditional breadbaskets, 
such as the Punjab in India and Pakistan.
What Can Donors and Major Grain Producers 
Do to Improve Global Food Security?
Bilateral donors and the international institutions they support play a critical 
role in several aspects of the world food system, including public invest-
ments in developing countries; funding of agricultural R&D; and provision of 
early warning systems, food aid, and humanitarian assistance. Many Western 
countries and other emerging donors (such as Brazil and China) are also major 
grain producers. Together these countries have enormous potential to improve 
the global food system through international resource flows, including knowl-
edge dissemination. Given the evidence cited in this monograph on the causes 
and consequences of the crisis, what major actions should these countries 
take to improve the global food system?
  Perhaps the least controversial goal should be to refocus foreign aid on 
agriculture. This shift back to agriculture was already taking place before the 
recent crisis, as donors became increasingly cognizant of the neglect of agri-
culture in developing countries and in aid institutions themselves (Bezemer 
and Headey 2008; World Bank 2008b). Although many donors were already 
in the process of ramping up agricultural aid, the food crisis undoubtedly re-
emphasized the critical and multidimensional role that food production and 
food prices play in human development, especially in organizations that were 
debating a withdrawal from agricultural investments (for example, the Asian 
Development Bank). So the good news is that there is now a wider consensus 
on the importance of agriculture, backed up by an impressive list of donor 
commitments to agricultural development (see von Braun 2008b; Abbott and 
Borot de Battisti 2009; Demeke, Pangrazio, and Maetz 2009). The potentially 
bad news is that with the financial crisis looming as the next big threat to 
both donor countries and their recipients, there is a very real concern that 
the more than US$12 billion in aid commitments to food security and agricul-
ture that were made in 2008 will not be kept.
  Moreover, donors cannot solve the global imbalance by throwing money 
at the problem. Aid effectiveness is undoubtedly conditional on the proactive 
policy efforts of aid recipients. But developing countries vary substantially 
in how much they emphasize agricultural development and how well they 
can implement agricultural projects. Even where the political will is strong, 
weak technical capacity is a real issue because of a history of underinvest-
ment and the hasty adoption of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s 
and 1990s that often left an institutional vacuum in the agricultural sector. 
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investment—in this institutional vacuum is going to be a key policy challenge 
in the years to come. It is perhaps understandable that many developing 
countries have opted for the quick fix of subsidizing fertilizers, but there are 
understandable doubts about how financially sustainable these programs are 
(Poulton, Kydd, and Dorward 2006; Dorward et al. 2009) and what the implicit 
costs are of neglecting other R&D and infrastructure. Indeed, those with a 
longer perspective recall that the 1972–74 crisis produced some extremely 
costly subsidy programs that are politically difficult to dismantle. Scaling up 
agricultural development projects in an efficient and sustainable way is the 
critical policy challenge in the years to come.
Concluding Remarks
With the benefit of hindsight, the causes of the current food crisis are increas-
ingly clear, even if there are still some doubts about the precise magnitude 
of each factor and certain misperceptions still persist in the public arena. It 
is also clear that many poor countries have been hard hit by the sharp rise in 
food prices over recent years. Taking action to limit the vulnerability of poor 
populations to increasing food prices is essential in the short run, but it is also 
vital in the longer run. After all, millions of poor people face their own food 
crises on year-to-year, season-to-season, and day-to-day bases. Their prob-
lems are enduring and indicative of deeper deficiencies in both national and 
international food systems that are hardly new. Reflecting on these issues in 
the wake of the 1972–74 crisis, Gale Johnson wrote:
The primary reason we have failed to achieve the degree of interna-
tional food security that is now possible is not nature but man. And the 
aspect of man that is responsible for our failure is not man as a farmer 
or scientist or extension worker or grain marketer or food retailer but 
man as a politician. (1981, 257)
These remarks are just as pertinent today as they were three decades ago. 
Given the right incentives and the right opportunities, farmers, traders, scien-
tists, and others can engage in activities that improve both their own welfare 
and also lift millions of others permanently out of poverty and hunger. Yet the 
catalyst for these activities will be farsighted and deeply committed policy 
actions that address the most fundamental problems facing both international 
and national food systems.
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Figure A.1  Response of import quantity to rising international food prices







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table A.2  U.S. maize, soybean, and wheat production profits per 
planted acre, excluding government payments, 2004–09 (U.S. dollars)
Crop  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Value of production less all costs
Maize n.a.  –126.5  –57.9 25.0  100.0  14.6
Soybeans n.a.  n.a.  –23.3 58.3  110.3  79.1
Wheat  –48.1  –74.8  –72.8  –27.9 56.4  –62.6
Value of production less operating costs
Maize  n.a.  74.1 145.9  240.0 333.7 264.2
Soybeans n.a.  n.a. 161.4  252.1  318.7  308.3
Wheat 71.7  53.2  59.0 111.1  208.1  n.a. 
Source:   Data are from USDA (2008d).
Notes:   Values for the two most recent months are revised or preliminary. Values are U.S. aver-
ages; n.a., data not available.
Table A.3  Price changes in leading staples by country, 2008
  Change in prices (percent)
     Average
     increase  January–  July–
     M-07  June  December 
Country Commodity  Market  to  M-08a   2008  2008
Exporting countries
  United States  Maize  Export  35.4  24.5  –36.9
  Thailand  Rice  Export  111.1  80.3  –27.3
  United States  Sorghum  Export  20.1  4.5  –34.5
  United States  Wheat  Export  32.9  –21.9  –25.2
Central America
  Costa Ricab  Rice (second quality)  Retail  26.6  –10.2 43.0
  Dominican Republic  Rice  Wholesale  7.7  10.8  16.0
  El Salvadorb Maize  Retail  4.7 13.6  –12.0
  Guatemala  Maize (white)  Wholesale  –4.4 14.6  3.4
  Haiti  Rice (imported)  Retail  27.4  –5.6  –30.9
  Honduras  Maize (white)  Wholesale  –6.6 39.0  4.6
  Mexico  Maize (white)  Wholesale  3.5  13.1  –4.0
  Nicaragua  Rice  Retail  37.8  23.3  3.3
  Panama  Rice  Retail  7.2  20.6  0.0
South America
  Argentina  Maize (yellow)  Wholesale  6.0  –1.2  –14.4
  Bolivia  Wheat  Wholesale  40.5  33.1  –7.1
  Brazil  Rice (first quality)  Wholesale  37.7  34.2  –15.4
  Chile  Rice  Retail  46.3  67.6  n.a.
  Colombia  Rice  Wholesale  39.2  52.0  12.1
  Peru  Rice  Retail  7.6  –4.3  –5.8
  Uruguay  Wheat (flour)  Wholesale  33.2  30.9  –16.2
(continued)106  APPENDIX
Table A.3  Continued
  Change in prices (percent)
     Average
     increase  January–  July–
     M-07  June  December 
Country Commodity  Market  to  M-08a   2008  2008
East Asia
  China  Rice (Indica) Wholesale  6.3  8.1 0.3
  Philippines  Regular milled rice  Wholesale  20.5  38.6  –9.4
  Thailand  Rice  Wholesale  75.3  44.5  –6.8
  Vietnam  Rice  Retail  25.7  44.0  –17.2
South Asia
  Afghanistan  Wheat  Retail  71.4  24.2  n.a.
  Bangladesh  Rice (coarse)  Wholesale  31.1  2.4  –24.1
  India  Rice  Wholesale  15.7  2.2  4.6
  Pakistan  Wheat  Retail  36.4  –0.3 4.1
  Sri Lanka  Rice  Retail  39.2  –8.8 n.a.
Eastern Africa
  Djibouti  Rice (belem) Retail 63.7  9.5 n.a.
  Egypt  Rice  Retail  25.9  11.8  n.a.
  Ethiopia  Maize  Wholesale  114.7  119.2  –45.0
  Kenyab Maize  Wholesale  60.1  41.7  0.6
  Ugandab Maize  Wholesale  108.6  27.6  –1.2
  Sudan  Millet  Wholesale  59.7  68.5  n.a.
Southern Africa
  Burundi  Maize  Retail  21.8  154.8  –28.0
  Democratic Republic   Cassava Retail  56.7  59.3  n.a.
    of Congob,c 
  Madagascar  Rice (local)  Retail  –8.1  –6.2  –0.6
  Malawi  Maize  Retail  116.3  52.9  3.3
  Mozambique  Maize (white)  Retail  42.3  5.7  10.4
  Namibia  Millet  Retail  10.9  31.2  1.7
  Rwandab Beans  Wholesale  18.1  –9.1  –31.9
  South Africa  Maize (white)  Wholesale  –4.8 5.5  –3.1
  Tanzaniab Maize  Wholesale  73.1  –26.9 32.6
  Zambia  Maize (white)  Retail  25.6  –9.9 40.7
West Africa
  Burkina Faso  Millet (local)  Wholesale  14.2  25.9  –12.8
  Cameroon  Maize  Retail  8.4  5.5  23.6
  Ghana  Maize (white)  Retail  39.1  84.6  0.0
  Mali  Millet (local)  Wholesale  8.4  14.3  –17.4
  Mauritania  Wheat (flour)  Retail  12.8  –0.4  –4.6
  Niger  Sorghum  Wholesale  26.4  16.0  3.3
  Nigeria  Millet  Wholesale  113.9  11.0  –21.3d
  Senegal  Millet  Retail  7.0  8.3  –5.1
  Senegal  Rice (imported)  Retail  51.5  58.9  –3.3
  Togo  Maize  Retail  38.9  62.3  –14.6
Source:   Calculations by the authors using data from GIEWS (2009).
Notes:   n.a., data not available.
aAverage percentage difference between the change in price from a given month in 2007 to the corre-
sponding month in 2008. In this way seasonal fluctuations can be accounted for.
bData for these countries are available in U.S. dollars only. They should be regarded with caution, as 
they may not be appropriately deflated.
cData for these countries are sparse and should be regarded with caution.
dThis figure applies from June to October rather than from June to December.ADDITIONAL DATA  107   
Table A.4  Comparing urban poverty impacts across three 
microsimulation studies
  Change in poverty headcount
 (percentage  points)
 IM:  DHH:  WEA:  Suggested  explanation
Country  Total poverty  Urban poverty  Total poverty  of discrepancy
Nigeria  —  6.1  0.56  WEA results may be too low 
              because urban poverty is high
             in Nigeria and foods covered 
             in their report represent just
             11.5 percent of consumption.
Cambodia 1  5.8    —   DHH results are probably too 
      high, given that IM employ 
more sophisticated 
methodology and most 
Cambodians are rural.
Senegal  —  0.4  4   DHH results may be too low, 
              given Senegal’s dependence 
on imports.
Ghana —  3.1  0.6    DHH results may be too high, 
    given low urban poverty and 
the diversified Ghanaian diet. 
WEA results are also similar 
to Cudjoe, Breisinger, and 
Diao (2008).
Guinea —  1.3  2.5
Pakistan 2.56  1.8  —
Nicaragua 4.3  3.7  —
Madagascar 3.6  4    —
Malawi —  1  0.6
Gabon —  1.1  1.4
Bolivia 1  1.2  —
Zambia 1  1.2  —
Vietnam 0.2  0.1  —
Mali —  2.3  2.3
Sources:   Constructed by the authors from Dessus, Herrera, and Hoyos (2008), Ivanic and Martin (2008), 
and Wodon et al. (2008).
Notes:   The table reports specific results from the three studies that maximize the basis for compari-
son: poverty is measured as changes in US$1 per day poverty headcount levels; price shocks 
are 20 percent; and only urban poverty results are reported, because the DHH results are the 
only ones common to other studies. In the case of WEA results, data have been adjusted in a 
linear fashion from their 25 percent price increase (that is, their results have been multiplied 
by 20 and then divided by 25). Variations in results reflect differences in surveys and simula-
tion methods. —, the study did not include the country in question; DHH, Dessus, Herrera, and 
Hoyos (2008); IM, Ivanic and Martin (2008); WEA, Wodon et al. (2008).References
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The dramatic surge in food prices from 2005 to 2008 
seriously threatened the world’s poor, who struggle to buy food even under normal circum-
stances, and led to protests and riots in the developing world. The crisis eventually receded, 
but such surges could recur unless steps are taken to prevent them. Using up-to-date informa-
tion, the authors of Re￿ections on the Global Food Crisis identify the key causes of the food 
price surge, its consequences for global poverty, and the challenges involved in preventing 
another crisis. 
     Breaking from many earlier interpretations, the authors conclude that the crisis was not 
primarily fostered by increased demand for meat products in rising economies such as China 
and India, or by declines in agricultural yields or food stocks, or by futures market speculation. 
Instead, they attribute the rising food prices to a combination of rising energy prices; growing 
demand for biofuels; the U.S. dollar depreciation; and various trade shocks related to export 
restrictions, panic purchases, and unfavorable weather. As part of their analysis, the authors 
also provide the ￿rst comprehensive review of both the macroeconomic and microeconomic 
consequences of the crisis, as well as a detailed comparison of the current crisis with the food 
price crisis of 1974. 
     To prevent another crisis, the authors conclude that the global food system should be 
reformed through several key steps: make trade in agricultural commodities more free yet 
more secure; address long-term threats to agricultural productivity, such as climate change 
and resource degradation; scale up social protection in potentially food-insecure countries; 
and encourage agricultural production in at least some of the countries now heavily depen-
dent on food imports. Re￿ections on the Global Food Crisis will be a valuable resource for 
policymakers, development specialists, and others concerned with the world’s poorest people.
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